The Three Communiqués or Three Joint Communiqués (Chinese: 三个联合公报) are a collection of three joint statements made by the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). The communiqués played a crucial role in the establishment of relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. and continue to be an essential element in dialogue between the two states, along with the Six Assurances and Taiwan Relations Act.
1st
The first communiqué (February 28, 1972), known as the Shanghai Communiqué, summarizes the landmark dialogue begun by President Richard Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai during February 1972. Some of the issues addressed in this communiqué include the two sides' views on Vietnam, the Korean Peninsula, India and Pakistan and the Kashmir region, and perhaps most importantly, the Taiwan (Republic of China) issue (i.e., Taiwan's political status). Essentially, both sides agreed to respect each other's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States formally acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China".
The use of the word "acknowledge" (rather than "accept") is often cited as an example of the United States' ambiguous position regarding the future of Taiwan.
2nd
The second communiqué (January 1, 1979), the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, formally announces the commencement of normal relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. In so doing, the United States recognized that the government of the People's Republic of China was the sole legal government of China, and acknowledged the PRC's position that Taiwan is part of China.[2] In addition, the United States government declared that it would end formal political relations with the Republic of China ("Taiwan") while preserving economic and cultural ties. Both sides reaffirmed their wish to reduce the risk of international conflict as well as avoidance of hegemony of any nation in the Asia-Pacific region.
3rd
The third communiqué (August 17, 1982), also known as the August 17th communiqué,[3] reaffirms the desire of both sides to further strengthen economic, cultural, educational, scientific, and technological ties. Both sides also reaffirmed the statements made about the Taiwan issue in the previous communiqué. Although no definitive conclusions were reached on the issue of arms sale to Taiwan, the United States declared its intent to continue selling arms to Taiwan and to gradually change its level of arms sales consistent with the PRC's militarization of the Taiwan strait.
A declassified cable sent on July 10, 1982, from Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to AIT director James R. Lilley explained that reducing arms sales to Taiwan would be contingent on the commitment of the PRC to a peace across the Taiwan Strait.[4] Afterwards, the US clarified the third communique by issuing the Six Assurances to Taiwan.
Six Assurances
The Six Assurances are six key foreign policy principles of the United States regarding United States–Taiwan relations. They were passed as unilateral U.S. clarifications to the Third Communiqué between the United States and the People's Republic of China in 1982. They were intended to reassure both Taiwan and the United States Congress that the US would continue to support Taiwan even if it had earlier cut formal diplomatic relations.
The assurances were originally proposed by the then Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) government of the Republic of China on Taiwan during negotiations between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China.[citation needed] The U.S. Reagan administration agreed to the assurances and informed the United States Congress of them in July 1982.
Today, the Six Assurances are part of semiformal guidelines used in conducting relations between the US and Taiwan. The assurances have been generally reaffirmed by successive U.S. administrations. Prior to 2016, they were purely informal, but in 2016, their formal content was adopted by the US House of Representatives and the Senate in non-binding resolutions, upgrading their status to formal but not directly enforceable.
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The United States House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution on May 16, 2016, giving the first formal wording for the Six Assurances by more or less directly adopting how the former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John H. Holdridge expressed them in 1982 (which was delivered to Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-kuo by then-Director of the American Institute in Taiwan James R. Lilley):[1]
“* * * [W]e did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan”;
“* * * [W]e see no mediation role for the United States” between Taiwan and the PRC;
“* * *[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC”;
“* * * [T]here has been no change in our longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan”;
“We have no plans to seek” revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act; and
The August 17 Communiqué “should not be read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan”.
A similar resolution passed the Senate on July 6, 2016.
Declassified cables, sent in 1982 from the State Department, detail the Six Assurances:[4]
The United States has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.
The United States has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.
The United States will not play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing.
The United States has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.
The United States has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.
The United States will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.
A similar resolution passed the Senate on July 6, 2016.[2]
In the first version, which was introduced to Congress by Rep. Steve Chabot on October 28, 2015, the Six Assurances were proposed to be:[3]
The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan;
The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act;
The United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about United States arms sales to Taiwan;
The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China;
The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China; and The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
In November 2020 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated “Taiwan has not been a part of China, and that was recognized with the work that the Reagan administration did to lay out the policies that the United States has adhered to now for three and a half decades, and done so under both administrations.” which was seen as invoking clause 5.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 reconfirmed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the Six Assurances as the foundation for US-Taiwan relations.
On August 2, 2022, Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, in a statement from a visit to Taiwan, made reference to the United States' continuing support of the TRA, Three Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11665
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