To Mr. Chairman 미국 대통령의 친서

The White House(May 24, 2018)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We greatly appreciate your time, patience, and effort with respect to our recent negotiations and discussions relative to a summit long sought by both parties, which was scheduled to take place on June 12 in Singapore. We were informed that the meeting was requested by North Korea, but that to us is totally irrelevant. I was very much looking forward to being there with you. Sadly, based on the tremendous anger and open hostility displayed in your most recent statement, I feel it is inappropriate, at this time, to have this long-planned meeting. Therefore, please let this letter serve to represent that the Singapore summit, for the good of both parties, but to the detriment of the world, will not take place. You talk about your nuclear capabilities, but ours are so massive and powerful that I pray to God they will never have to be used.

I felt a wonderful dialogue was building up between you and me, and ultimately, it is only the dialogue that matters. Some day, I look very much forward to meeting you. In the meantime, I want to thank you for the release of the hostages who are now home with their families. That was a beautiful gesture and was very much appreciated.

If you change your mind having to do with this most important summit, please do not hesitate to call me or write. The world, and North Korea in particular, has lost a great opportunity for lasting peace and great prosperity and wealth. This missed opportunity is a truly sad moment in history.

Sincerely yours,

Donald J. Trump

President of the United States of America

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Think Military Strikes Could Stop North Korea? Try It and See.

By MARK FITZPATRICK MAY 24, 2018

The White House seems to believe preventative strikes are a viable option. Try this simulation and you may find it’s not so simple.

Mark Weaver

United States-North Korean relations have been a rollercoaster in recent months. Escalating missile tests from Pyongyang and taunting tweets from the White House in 2017 were followed by a period of seeming rapprochement as President Trump and North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, agreed to meet for a summit to discuss “denuclarization.” And now things seem to be taking another turn for the worse.

On Thursday, Mr. Trump, in a fiery letter to Mr. Kim, called off the summit, following North Korea’s clarifications that it would not immediately give up its nuclear weapons. The Trump administration, led by the hawkish national security adviser John Bolton, seems to once again be contemplating military options. In his letter to Mr. Kim, Mr. Trump wrote, “You talk about your nuclear capabilities, but ours are so massive and powerful that I pray to God they will never have to be used.”

The results of any American military action against North Korea could be disastrous. To truly understand the consequences of what such a strike would mean, click through the options presented below.

This is an exercise based on what we know about American policy, North Korea’s military and the strategic calculus of Northeast Asia. It isn’t a sure thing, but it should make clear pretty quickly that the outcome of war on North Korea will be bad, worse or much, much worse.

Let‘s Begin.

It’s late June. Just a few weeks ago, preparations were moving along for an unprecedented summit between the American and North Korean leaders but those plans quickly unraveled. Mr. Trump is back to his bluster and Mr. Kim is back to his troublemaking.

The North Korean government conducts another test of its Hwasong-15 ICBM, the behemoth 71-ton, two-stage system first tested on Nov. 29, to confirm that the warhead can survive atmospheric re-entry. It seems to work.

President Trump feels he must act or Mr. Kim will have called his bluff. He decides that he will call for a “preventive” strike.

He has two options:

Start strong: a full-on military attack on North Korea.

The “bloody nose” strike is meant to be small. The Pentagon limits its operation to Tomahawk cruise missiles, launched from the Stethem and the McCampbell in the Japan Sea. They target a single North Korean military facility: the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground. It was selected not because it was the site of the latest missile launch ? that came from a mobile launcher elsewhere ? but because of the absence of observable activity.

This is supposed to show Mr. Kim that President Trump is willing and able to use force ? and compel him to accept negotiations aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear program. It doesn’t work that way.

The objective was to minimize casualties, but North Korea claims that 10 maintenance workers were killed.

Mr. Kim rejects Mr. Trump’s ultimatum and the American assurance that the strike was limited. His advisers firmly believe that not responding forcefully would signal surrender and encourage the United States to attack again. They tell him he has two options.

North Korea’s artillery strikes South Korean marine bases and military intelligence posts on islands in the disputed West Sea area. About 100 South Korean military personnel and civilians are killed.

North Korea conducted a similar strike in 2010, but with fewer casualties. At that time, South Korea’s rules of engagement meant its forces could respond only in kind ? using artillery shelling in response to an artillery attack. But South Korea’s rules of engagement changed soon afterward.

This time, South Korea’s military returns fire immediately with greater force, including aircraft strikes, and hits the sources of North Korea’s fire, as well as some local command posts.

Under the Mutual Defense Treaty that the United States has with South Korea, America must provide aid, though it is not required to go on the offensive. Trying to keep tensions limited, Washington sends fighter squadrons to South Korea but allows the South Korean Army to do the fighting.

Still, escalation is inevitable.

North Korea, using long-range multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery pieces, attacks a dozen South Korean bases and American camps, all within 30 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. About 1,000 South Korean and American military personnel are killed.

With American troops dead, President Trump makes a speech promising a swift and thorough response. The Pentagon fully agrees with the need to retaliate.

Foreigners start to leave South Korea. Civilians begin a mass exodus from Seoul but the highways and bridges quickly become clogged, creating roadblocks for South Korean and American units moving north.

North Korea fires 1,000 long-range artillery pieces and, in addition to conventional weapons, terrorizes Seoul with mustard- and nerve-gas-filled shells from its 2,500- to 5,000-ton arsenal of chemical weapons. Via tunnels, low-flying planes and mini-submarines, North Korea inserts thousands of special operations forces into South Korea.

The United States and South Korea must now decide how to respond.

Joint South Korea and United States forces fire hundreds of long-range artillery at North Korea, including M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries. Within a week, they have quieted the North’s artillery. American and South Korean aircraft take out North Korea’s air defense. Some 100,000 civilians and soldiers ? on both sides of the border ? are dead. North Korean Special Forces continue to conduct sabotage operations inside the South.

The Combined Forces Command, made up of the American and South Korean militaries, prepares for an invasion of North Korea.

With a bloody war raging on its doorstep, China, North Korea’s closest ally, must decide what to do next.

President Xi Jinping of China calls President Trump, warning that in accordance with the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, China will undertake all necessary measures to repel further American attacks on North Korea.

In effect, China would repeat its 1950 intervention in the Korean War, when its 270,000 “volunteers” repelled Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s march through North Korea. This time, though, China signals that it is ready to take on the United States in fronts besides the Korean Peninsula.

Back in Washington, it becomes clear that there are two choices. China’s ultimatum could give everyone involved in this conflict a chance to put an end to the fighting and negotiate a peace on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, some in the Situation Room argue, the United States shouldn’t cow to Beijing’s demands. They say a war with the rising great power is inevitable.

President Trump’s advisers consider various options but realize that a war with China would be too costly. The president reluctantly acquiesces to China’s demand to withdraw, in exchange for China’s agreement to force North Korea to fully denuclearize.

But how China could force the North to give up its nuclear weapons ? short of invading ? isn’t clear. In the end, North Korea’s claims to have destroyed its nuclear weapons cannot be verified.

South Korea, having been victimized by North Korea’s chemical and conventional weapons, is reluctant to stop fighting. Only after several more months of inconclusive skirmishes ? and without American support ? Seoul sues for peace. A million people have died and the peninsula remains divided.

You can try again, but at the risk of spoiling the exercise: There’s no way a military expedition against North Korea won’t have terrible costs that outweigh the benefits. It won‘t make Americans any safer.

-----------------

President Trump decides that a small attack on North Korea won’t be enough. Instead, he orders a full-scale assault on the Kim regime’s nuclear and missile facilities, designed to completely destroy Kim Jong-un’s ability to pose a nuclear threat.

The attack begins in the middle of the night. B-2 stealth bombers fly out from the American base in Guam and target the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and the submarine-launched ballistic missile development site at Sinpo South Shipyard. Stealth F-35 bombers, deployed from the Wasp and the Carl Vinson, strike every other known or suspected launch and storage site for mobile missiles. Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from Navy destroyers in the Sea of Japan hit the Tonghae and Sohae Satellite Launching Stations. The North Koreans, meanwhile, are paralyzed for the moment.

Back in the Situation Room in Washington, all eyes are on China, North Korea’s ally and neighbor. To encourage Beijing to stay out of the conflict, the American military avoids striking targets within 50 miles of the Chinese border.

But in Beijing, Chinese military authorities are weighing their options. They see the American strike as a major provocation. They face two choices.

China decides to watch and wait. This is a relief for American military planners ? but it’s not all good news.

The Blitzkrieg-style attack has demolished much of North Korea’s strategic infrastructure but not all of it. Some of the North’s mobile missile launchers remain; the storage bunkers for its 30 to 40 nuclear weapons couldn’t be located.

Mr. Kim orders his military to launch four 50-kiloton nuclear-armed Scud missiles at the Port of Busan in South Korea. He also orders four nuclear-armed Nodong missiles aimed at the United States Marine Corps Air Station in Iwakuni, Japan.

American, South Korean and Japanese missile defenses shoot down most of the missiles, but one Scud and one Nodong make it through.

Some 250,000 people are killed in Busan; 50,000 more perish in Iwakuni when the bomb hits the city rather than the air base. Mr. Kim, broadcasting from a secret bunker, goes on television and announces that unless the United States pulls out of the war, American cities will be annihilated.

<중국 최후통첩>

President Xi Jinping of China calls President Trump, warning that in accordance with the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, China will undertake all necessary measures to repel further American attacks on North Korea.

In effect, China would repeat its 1950 intervention in the Korean War, when its 270,000 “volunteers” repelled Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s march through North Korea. This time, though, China signals that it is ready to take on the United States in fronts besides the Korean Peninsula.

Back in Washington, it becomes clear that there are two choices. China’s ultimatum could give everyone involved in this conflict a chance to put an end to the fighting and negotiate a peace on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, some in the Situation Room argue, the United States shouldn’t cow to Beijing’s demands. They say a war with the rising great power is inevitable.

The United States can’t afford a war with another world power. Washington gives up.

(War is inevitable. Time to get it over with.

The United States rejects China’s demand.

The two superpowers go to war. The global economy plummets immediately. The second casualty is Taiwan ? an amphibious assault by the Chinese Army quickly overtakes the island as American aircraft carriers stay away to avoid China’s “carrier killer” DF-21D medium-range ballistic missiles.

The war rapidly turns nuclear. The United States has a 25-fold advantage in nuclear firepower but at a certain point it doesn’t matter. Half of China’s 60-odd intercontinental ballistic missiles break through American missile defenses. Millions of people die in both countries.

You can try again, but at the risk of spoiling the exercise: There’s no way a military expedition against North Korea won’t have terrible costs that outweigh the benefits. It won‘t make Americans any safer.)

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   다음은 이날 조선중앙통신을 통해 발표한 김계관 제1부상의 담화 전문. 

      

    조선민주주의인민공화국 외무성 제1부상 김계관은 25일 위임에 따라 다음과 같은 담화를 발표하였다.

    지금 조미(북미)사이에는 세계가 비상한 관심 속에 주시하는 역사적인 수뇌 상봉이 일정에 올라있으며 그 준비사업도 마감단계에서 추진되고 있다.

    수십 년에 걸친 적대와 불신의 관계를 청산하고 조미관계개선의 새로운 이정표를 마련하려는 우리의 진지한 모색과 적극적인 노력들은 내외의 한결같은 공감과 지지를 받고 있다.

    그런 가운데 24일 미합중국 트럼프 대통령이 불현듯 이미 기정사실화되어있던 조미(북미) 수뇌상봉을 취소하겠다는 공식입장을 발표하였다.

    트럼프 대통령은 그 이유에 대하여 우리 외무성 최선희 부상의 담화내용에 ‘커다란 분노와 노골적인 적대감’이 담겨있기 때문이라고 하면서 오래전부터 계획되어있던 귀중한 만남을 가지는 것이 현시점에서는 적절치 않다고 밝히었다.

    나는 조미(북미)수뇌상봉에 대한 트럼프 대통령의 입장표명이 조선반도는 물론 세계의 평화와 안정을 바라는 인류의 염원에 부합되지 않는 결정이라고 단정하고 싶다.

    트럼프 대통령이 거론한 ‘커다란 분노와 노골적인 적대감’이라는것은 사실 조미(북미)수뇌상봉을 앞두고 일방적인 핵 폐기를 압박해온 미국 측의 지나친 언행이 불러온 반발에 지나지 않는다.

    벌어진 불미스러운 사태는 역사적 뿌리가 깊은 조미(북미) 적대관계의 현 실태가 얼마나 엄중하며 관계개선을 위한 수뇌 상봉이 얼마나 절실히 필요한가를 그대로 보여주고 있다.

    역사적인 조미(북미)수뇌상봉에 대하여 말한다면 우리는 트럼프 대통령이 지난 시기 그 어느 대통령도 내리지 못한 용단을 내리고 수뇌 상봉이라는 중대사변을 만들기 위해 노력한 데 대하여 의연 내심 높이 평가하여 왔다.

    그런데 돌연 일방적으로 회담취소를 발표한 것은 우리로서는 뜻밖의 일이며 매우 유감스럽게 생각하지 않을 수 없다. 

    수뇌 상봉에 대한 의지가 부족했는지 아니면 자신감이 없었던 탓인지 그 이유에 대해서는 가늠하기 어려우나 우리는 역사적인 조미(북미) 수뇌 상봉과 회담 그 자체가 대화를 통한 문제 해결의 첫걸음으로서 지역과 세계의 평화와 안전, 두 나라 사이의 관계개선에 의미 있는 출발점이 되리라는 기대를 하고 성의 있는 노력을 다하여왔다.

    또한 ‘트럼프 방식’이라고 하는 것이 쌍방의 우려를 다같이 해소하고 우리의 요구조건에도 부합되며 문제 해결의 실질적 작용을 하는 현명한 방안이 되기를 은근히 기대하기도 하였다.

    우리 국무위원회 위원장께서도 트럼프 대통령과 만나면 좋은 시작을 뗄 수 있을 것이라고 하시면서 그를 위한 준비에 모든 노력을 기울여오시었다.

    그럼에도 불구하고 미국 측의 일방적인 회담취소공개는 우리로 하여금 여직껏(여태껏) 기울인 노력과 우리가 새롭게 선택하여 가는 이 길이 과연 옳은가 하는 것을 다시금 생각하게 만들고 있다.

    하지만 조선반도와 인류의 평화와 안정을 위하여 모든 것을 다하려는 우리의 목표와 의지에는 변함이 없으며 우리는 항상 대범하고 열린 마음으로 미국 측에 시간과 기회를 줄 용의가 있다.

    만나서 첫술에 배가 부를 리는 없겠지만, 한가지씩이라도 단계별로 해결해나간다면 지금보다 관계가 좋아지면 좋아졌지 더 나빠지기야 하겠는가 하는 것쯤은 미국도 깊이 숙고해보아야 할 것이다.

    우리는 아무 때나 어떤 방식으로든 마주앉아 문제를 풀어나갈 용의가 있음을 미국 측에 다시금 밝힌다.

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Bush Writes to North Korean Leader

By HELENE COOPERDEC. 6, 2007

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뉴욕타임스/WASHINGTON, Dec. 6 — President Bush, directly engaging the man he publicly called a “tyrant” and privately called a “pygmy,” wrote a letter to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in which he held out the prospect of normalized relations with the United States if North Korea fully disclosed all nuclear programs and got rid of its nuclear weapons, administration officials said.

The unprecedented high-level personal letter from Mr. Bush to the leader of the country he famously placed alongside Iraq and Iran in his “axis of evil” in 2002 came as American negotiators were struggling to get the secretive Pyongyang government to fully explain and disclose the extent, use and spread of North Korea’s nuclear material and technology, while also urging other nations to maintain pressure on Iran in the wake of a new assessment that Tehran had halted nuclear weapons work in 2003.

An administration official said Mr. Bush addressed the letter, “Dear Mr. Chairman,” and signed it by hand.

The letter underscores just how much the White House wants to make sure that one of the administration’s most tangible diplomatic accomplishments does not slip away.

North Korea agreed in October to dismantle all of its nuclear facilities and to disclose all of its past and present nuclear programs by the end of the year in return for 950,000 metric tons of fuel oil or its equivalent in economic aid. That agreement has come under fierce criticism from conservative national security hawks, but many foreign policy experts point to it as a rare diplomatic success in a period that has been dominated by frustration in Iran, the Middle East and Pakistan.

The White House declined to provide transcripts of the letter and sought to minimize its significance by pointing out that Mr. Bush also wrote letters to the leaders of four other countries in the so-called “six party” group, made up of China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the United States. “In these letters, the president reiterated our commitment to the six-party talks and stressed the need for North Korea to come forward with a full and complete declaration of their nuclear programs, as called for in the September 2005 six-party agreement,” said Gordon D. Johndroe, a White House spokesman.

But Mr. Bush talks to the leaders of China, Russia, Japan and South Korea all the time. And the letters were not identical, administration officials said. “The letter to Kim Jong-il speaks of the six-party process and its historical mission, and lays out a vision of normalization and complete denuclearization,” a senior administration official said. “They are all different,” he said.

Another administration official said the letter flags the need to resolve three sticking points: the number of warheads that North Korea has built, the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material produced by North Korea and the need for North Korea to disclose that it has passed nuclear material to others.

The proliferation issue has taken on new importance after an Israeli strike in Syria in September, which American and Israeli officials said was conducted against a nuclear facility near the Euphrates River that was supplied with material from North Korea. Administration officials want North Korea to disclose what help it may have given Syria, although they also say that that help came before Pyongyang agreed to dismantle its nuclear reactor and disclose its nuclear programs.

The letter to Mr. Kim is dated Dec. 1, administration officials said. Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, delivered it to his North Korean counterpart in Beijing on Wednesday. Within hours, North Korea announced that Mr. Kim had received the letter.

That is a huge leap from the veritable cold war that existed between Mr. Bush and Mr. Kim for most of the Bush administration. In 2002, Mr. Bush referred to Mr. Kim as a “pygmy” and compared him to a “spoiled child at a dinner table” during a meeting with Republican senators, according to news reports at the time.