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DOD Official Says Concept of Integrated Deterrence Is Call to Action

Sept. 28, 2021 | By Terri Moon Cronk, DOD News |

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2791589/dod-official-says-concept-of-integrated-deterrence-is-call-to-action/

 

In a speech earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III called deterrence the cornerstone of defense to make sure U.S. adversaries know that the risk of aggression is out of line with any conceivable benefit, a key Defense Department official said today.

Gregory M. Kausner, performing the duties of undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, was the keynote speaker at the Common Defense 2021 expo this morning.

"In describing a new vision of 'integrated deterrence,' he [Austin] said that while it still rests on the same logic, it now spans multiple realms," Kausner said. "The right mix of technology, operational concepts and capabilities — all woven together and networked / in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause."

That approach is multi-domain, spans numerous geographic areas of responsibility, is united with allies and partners, ((and is fortified by all instruments of national power)), he said.

"(For those of us in the acquisition and sustainment enterprise), the concept of integrated deterrence is a call to action," Kausner said.

DOD must continue to evolve its policies, processes — and, most importantly, its culture — to ensure the United States and its network of allies and partners remain predominant across the 21st century battle space, he said.

The purpose in DOD's acquisition and sustainment is to enable the delivery and sustainment of secure, resilient and preeminent capabilities to the warfighter and international partners, Kausner emphasized.

As defense acquisition has evolved, the geopolitical landscape of today calls for an integrated suite of capabilities to field a lethal, resilient and rapidly adapting joint force, he said.

"Developing such capabilities should be guided by mission engineering — a means to achieve desired war fighting effects through scoped requirements, guided development, and informed investment — to directly link programs with the missions they must accomplish," he explained.

"Put simply, the mission architecture is the business model for the conduct of operations," he noted. Kausner also added that, as overarching mission architecture is illuminated, DOD is able to identify critical mission threads and the necessary end-to-end tasks.

Kausner said the acquisition enterprise must center the force of its considerable resources, ingenuity and expertise on the critical linkages that enable war fighters to complete the kill chain.

 

In recent years, DOD began that process with a comprehensive redesign of its acquisition policies. The result was the adaptive acquisition framework -- one of the most transformational changes to defense acquisition in years, he said.

With six distinct pathways, Kausner said the framework empowers program teams to tailor their approaches to a specific capability, making DOD more agile and more disciplined in addressing acquisition challenges at the program level.

Kausner said that to ensure a ready workforce, DOD is putting in place a comprehensive talent management framework focused on streamlining certification requirements, expanding job-relevant credentialing opportunities, and providing a continuous learning model. It's also adopting best-practices to optimize our performance.

Kausner said that DOD is also evolving into a data-centric enterprise, one that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency.

And while DOD is just scratching the surface, there's an imperative to advance defense acquisition at the enterprise level, he said. A holistic approach to enterprise acquisition is necessary — one that integrates policies and processes at the micro level, but also aligns other key aspects of defense acquisition at the macro level, he explained.

Kausner said that to identify and address interdependencies and critical risks, DOD must broaden its assessments to include a portfolio of systems. The department is adopting integrated acquisition portfolio reviews to strengthen synchronization of warfighting concepts, requirements, technologies and program execution.

"We are in the midst of a rebalance from a program-centric approach to a portfolio-based perspective," he said. "For example, instead of looking only at a specific munition, we're more focused on how that system fits into the broader integrated air and missile defense capability portfolio," he explained.

Such an outlook enables DOD to not only see all the dots, but to connect them to directly align decision making with operational needs, Kausner said.

"We can expect adversaries to challenge our logistics dominance from the homeland to the outer reaches of the battle space," he said, adding that cross-cutting portfolio reviews will highlight the impact of contested logistics by evaluating material shortages, munitions levels and fuel supply chains across a range of systems.

"Climate change will also continue to alter our operational environment," he said. "Going forward, portfolio reviews will assess the efficacy of both our emerging programs and our supporting infrastructure in the face of shifting environments."

Adopting a portfolio perspective will also enable a healthy, vibrant, and — most importantly — a viable defense industrial base now and into the future, Kausner said.

 

 

DOD Official Outlines U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy

Sept. 2, 2020 | By David Vergun, DOD News |

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2334600/dod-official-outlines-us-nuclear-deterrence-strategy/

 

There is broad, bipartisan support for the modernization of the nuclear triad, which includes bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines and the systems that control them, a Defense Department expert said.

Robert Soofer, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, also said support is more divided for the creation of W76-2, which is a class of low-yield, tactical nuclear warhead that is different from those in the nuclear triad. An example would be a submarine-launched ballistic missile nuclear warhead. To understand the divide over support for W76-2, one must have an understanding of the two schools of thought on the best approach to nuclear deterrence, Soofer told the Air Force Association Mitchell Institute's Nuclear Deterrence Forum today.

Each school of thought has its advocates, including members of Congress, interest groups and think tanks, he noted. The first school of thought is known as simple nuclear deterrence, sometimes referred to as minimum deterrence. The thought is that deterrence is best achieved with a limited number of nuclear weapons that, for example, could destroy a certain number of an adversary's cities, Soofer said. The viability of the deterrence is created by an adversary's fear of uncontrolled nuclear escalation.

The second school of thought is known as complex nuclear deterrence. This recognizes that nuclear deterrence can be more complicated, requiring an understanding of the adversary and various scenarios that could play out, he said. This strategy also pays close attention to the nuclear balance and places a premium on ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces ( that can threaten the adversary). The complex nuclear deterrence approach has been the basis of U.S. nuclear policy since about the 1960s, and it rests on presenting the president with a number of options and capabilities( — particularly in a regional conflict — )that would deter Russia's nuclear use in any scenario, he said.

This is particularly important since Russia has expanded its nuclear capability, and has espoused a doctrine of limited first use, meaning the use of low-yield tactical nuclear warheads, Soofer said.

Having W76-2 capability demonstrates to Russia that the U.S. has taken practical steps to ensure that adversaries can derive no benefit from even limited nuclear use, he said.

There is a very high bar that must be met before the president(, who is the only one who can order the use of nuclear weapons,) will contemplate the use of W76-2 warhead, or any other nuclear weapon for that matter, Soofer said.

 

Having a range of nuclear weapons capabilities not only deters nuclear attacks, but it also deters large-scale conventional and biological and chemical attacks and reassures allies and partners, he said.

 

That is why the U.S. has not adopted a "no use first" policy when it comes to using nuclear weapons, he said, adding that circumstance for first use would have to be extreme, meaning to defend the vital interest of the U.S., allies and partners.

The objectives of the U.S. nuclear strategy are two-fold, he said. "First and foremost is to deter war, both conventional and nuclear; second, should nuclear deterrence fail, [is] to deter further nuclear use and hopefully bring the war to an end before the worst imaginable nuclear catastrophe unfolds."

Therefore, the U.S. nuclear strategy doesn't rely solely on massive and immediate attacks against an adversary, he said, (though the U.S. maintains this capability to deter adversaries from contemplating a first strike against the United States). "Massive attacks would represent the failure of our nuclear strategy. Rather, our nuclear strategy as articulated in the [2018] Nuclear Posture Review calls for tailored deterrence with flexible capabilities, including an appropriate mix of nuclear capability and limited, graduated response options — something administrations (over the last six decades) have valued," Soofer said.

In sum, U.S. nuclear strategy is one of resolve and restraint, he said. "Our limited use of nuclear weapons in response to a Russian or Chinese attack is intended to demonstrate resolve, convincing the adversary that it has really miscalculated when it contemplated the use of nuclear weapons."

The strategy also communicates restraint, sending a message to the adversary that it has much more to lose if it continues down the path of nuclear escalation, he said.

 

 

 

Conventional-Nuclear Integration in the Next National Defense Strategy

By: John K. Warden, OCTOBER 26, 2020, CNAS

https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/conventional-nuclear-integration-in-the-next-national-defense-strategy

 

The Bottom Line

The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) should prioritize conventional-nuclear integration so that: U.S. defense and nuclear policies give precedence to deterring limited adversary aggression that is backed by threats of escalation, including across the nuclear threshold.

Deliberate combatant command plans are designed to achieve U.S. objectives while minimizing the risk of nuclear escalation.

Combatant commands have adaptive planning capabilities and procedures to develop courses of action that will achieve U.S. objectives should the adversary employ nuclear weapons.

The Joint Force is prepared to conduct operations under threat of adversary nuclear employment, and if necessary, in a nuclear environment.

The best mix of U.S. nuclear, non-nuclear, and dual-use capabilities are fielded to deter conflict and escalation.

 

Introduction

Many of the challenges that will confront the next NDS relate to new military technologies, ranging from maneuvering hypersonic-speed missiles to artificial intelligence and machine learning. It is just as important for the strategy to account for how major power adversaries may rely on a proven technology—nuclear weapons—to advance their interests in a conflict with the United States and its allies. For too long, the trend was to treat nuclear weapons issues as a bolted-on annex of U.S. defense planning. But now that U.S. defense strategy has recentered on preparing for high-intensity conflict with nuclear-armed adversaries, the next NDS must build on the limited progress that has been made to integrate conventional and nuclear strategy, planning, doctrine, and capabilities.

 

Strategy

The United States needs a strategy for fighting wars with nuclear-armed adversaries over limited objectives. Whether in a conflict with Russia or China, the United States requires a warfighting approach that allows it a chance to achieve limited objectives while deterring major escalation, including an adversary’s decision to employ nuclear weapons to terminate a conflict on terms favorable to it. Moreover, if deterrence of nuclear employment fails, the United States needs political-military options for achieving its objectives while managing the risk of further escalation. Having such a strategy, backed by effective planning, doctrine, operational concepts, and capabilities, will help deter conflict and increase the likelihood that the United States can favorably manage escalation should conflict occur.

The United States needs a strategy for fighting wars with nuclear-armed adversaries over limited objectives.

Over the past decade, there has been a greater recognition of the threat of limited nuclear escalation by U.S. adversaries. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review argued for the importance of U.S. nuclear forces in “communicating to potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression.”1 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) picked up on this theme, focusing on the need to deter limited nuclear attack by potential adversaries and achieve U.S. objectives should an adversary cross the nuclear threshold.2 For the most part, concern with adversary limited nuclear employment has focused on Russia, and to a lesser extent North Korea, but officials and analysts have also suggested that China might consider nuclear escalation in extreme circumstances, despite its no-first-use pledge.3

 

Favorably managing escalation is sure to be a theme in the next NDS, but at least three issues will need to be debated. First, how are opponents likely to leverage an increasing number of nuclear/conventional-capable (“dual-capable”) theater range systems against the United States and its allies? These systems are clearly important to opponents’ theater campaign planning, but questions remain about how Russia and China are likely to conduct integrated nuclear-conventional operations and manipulate risk. Second, just how dire is the threat of adversary nuclear escalation? Despite an overall increase in concern about limited nuclear employment, there is debate about just how likely Russia or China would be to consider nuclear employment, and in what circumstances.4 Third, what is most likely to affect adversary calculations regarding nuclear employment? Some argue that the key to persuading opponents not to consider nuclear employment is to strengthen the U.S. political commitment to allies, and thus demonstrate resolve.5 Others maintain that supplemental, more credible nuclear retaliatory options are needed.6 Many views fall in between. How the next NDS answers these questions for Russia and China will affect how the Department of Defense (DoD) prioritizes conventional-nuclear integration relative to other defense strategy initiatives.

 

Planning

Preparing for high-intensity conflict with nuclear-armed adversaries requires improvements to U.S. combatant command planning. In the years since the Cold War, there has been a large gap between nuclear and conventional planning. U.S. European Command and Indo-Pacific Command have developed detailed operational plans for fighting conventional wars with Russia and China respectively. More recently, they have been directed to include in their operational plan development input from other combatant commands. Even so, U.S. European Command and Indo-Pacific Command have, for the most part, deferred responsibility for nuclear weapons, leaving U.S. Strategic Command to consider the deterrence of adversary nuclear use and deliberate planning for U.S. nuclear employment.7

 

The 2018 NPR directed the department to “plan, train, and exercise to integrate U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear forces to operate in the face of adversary nuclear threats and employment.”8 U.S. European Command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO), and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command have begun to respond to the need to consider potential nuclear escalation in planning. Furthermore, the DoD writ large, through initiatives such as global integration and the development of a joint warfighting concept, has started to integrate planning between various regional and functional combatant commands.

 

Yet significant gaps remain. War plans for defeating or rolling back Russian or Chinese aggression must envision political objectives and a way of conducting operations that reduces the likelihood that an adversary will risk nuclear escalation. These plans must be seamlessly integrated among all relevant regional and functional commands, and they must include common objectives and approaches, clear responsibilities, and appropriate command and control arrangements. Planners need to understand why and when an opponent of the United States might choose to conduct nuclear strikes, and they need a thorough grasp of the challenges associated with opponents deploying increasing numbers of dual-capable theater range strike capabilities, collocating conventional and nuclear forces, and integrating conventional and nuclear command and control.

 

War plans for defeating or rolling back Russian or Chinese aggression must envision political objectives and a way of conducting operations that reduces the likelihood that an adversary will risk nuclear escalation.

 

In addition, the United States requires an improved planning capability to develop courses of action that will achieve its objectives should an opponent employ nuclear weapons. How can the joint force continue prosecuting its campaign while attempting to deter further nuclear employment by an adversary? The DoD can begin to answer this question in the deliberate planning process but must also have a robust adaptive planning capability that can quickly develop options appropriate to specific circumstances. The heightened potential of further nuclear escalation will make developing and implementing any course of action extremely complicated, even more so if the United States chooses to include in an ongoing conventional campaign the planning and execution of limited nuclear strikes.9 The department should grapple with where certain deliberate and adaptive planning capabilities should primarily reside, and with how to effectively coordinate among senior civilian leaders, combatant commands, and allies during a conflict.10

 

Doctrine

The United States must also ensure that it can conduct operations under threat of adversary nuclear employment and, if necessary, in a nuclear environment. An opponent is more likely to choose nuclear escalation if it perceives that it can significantly degrade the effectiveness of U.S. conventional operations. Unfortunately, however, the joint force is not adequately prepared or equipped to operate effectively in a nuclear environment.11 Cold War operational concepts for dispersal to reduce vulnerability to nuclear strikes have waned, as have unit standards for operating through radiation and electromagnetic pulse effects. A generation of military officers has fought in wars in which they never had to consider adversary employment of nuclear weapons.

 

The next NDS should ensure that joint doctrine supports effective operations under threat of nuclear employment. In addition to mandating that critical military platforms, weapons, and equipment meet hardening standards, the Department must prepare to operate using dispersed bases, logistics hubs, and formations, and it must train key conventional units to fight through nuclear effects. The services have begun developing their own concepts for conventional-nuclear integration, but these visions must be finalized, merged into joint doctrine, and then realized through procurement standards, professional military education, and training and exercise requirements.

 

As a general objective, preparing the joint force to operate under the threat of nuclear employment is likely to be uncontroversial; however, there is certain to be debate over nuclear hardening standards, given the additional expense, and whether dispersal and other measures can adequately address survivability concerns. In addition, conventionally oriented planners may resist making changes to operational concepts that will reduce efficiency and effectiveness should the adversary not employ nuclear weapons. There will always be a balance and difficult tradeoffs, but defense strategists should acknowledge that if U.S. conventional operations are perceived as vulnerable to nuclear strikes, there is a greater likelihood that an opponent will opt for nuclear escalation.

 

Capabilities

A final aspect of conventional-nuclear integration is finding the best mix of nuclear, non-nuclear, and dual-use capabilities to deter conflict and escalation. The potential for adversary nuclear escalation is a subset of a larger problem: those who oppose the United States have studied its way of war and developed multi-domain military capabilities of their own to deter and, if necessary, defeat U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. Russia and China are building capabilities that may allow them to take advantage of surprise, along with a favorable local balance, to impose their will on U.S. allies. With cyber weapons, counterspace capabilities, and long-range conventional strike, they have additional options for imposing costs on the United States and manipulating the risk of escalation. Dual-capable systems that can be mated with nuclear weapons are also part of these plans, and the option to conduct theater nuclear strikes is available to their political leaders. The United States, to defend its interests effectively, needs capabilities that can blunt adversary aggression against U.S. allies, and it needs its own credible options for threatening retaliation and escalation to deter adversary escalation.

 

Balancing investment among U.S. conventional, nuclear, and dual-use capabilities is an area in which there is likely to be significant debate during the development of the next NDS. According to one view, the DoD should deprioritize investment in nuclear weapons and focus instead on conventional contact- and blunt-layer forces that are most likely to deny a rapid fait accompli.12 Many who subscribe to this view think that the threat of adversary nuclear escalation is overblown, and that additional nuclear capabilities are more likely to cause instability than to strengthen deterrence. Others acknowledge the threat of adversary nuclear escalation but argue that denying the fait accompli is nonetheless the most effective tool for preventing escalation. Yet another view holds that deterring adversary nuclear escalation in a conflict requires a range of response options, including a variety of delivery platforms and yields, along with different ways of penetrating an opponent’s defenses, and that little money will be saved by trimming investment in nuclear weapons.13 According to this view, those who oppose the United States are less likely to initiate and escalate conflicts if they are less confident in their options for nuclear escalation.

 

The United States, to defend its interests effectively, needs capabilities that can blunt adversary aggression against U.S. allies.

 

In addition to continuing to recapitalize the nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers, the Donald Trump administration has pursued two supplemental capabilities: a limited number of low-yield warheads on ballistic missile submarines, which have now been deployed; and a new nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), which is undergoing an analysis of alternatives. With defense budgets likely to be tight, these decisions, particularly the pursuit of a nuclear SLCM, will be reviewed. The department will be forced to prioritize among major acquisition programs, and it may have to choose between marginal increases in conventional or nuclear deterrence. Deploying a nuclear-capable SLCM, for example, may cause adversaries to be more hesitant to cross the nuclear threshold, but this decision could come at the cost of tying up platforms, or missile or torpedo tubes, that are needed for conventional warfighting. On the other hand, forgoing the deployment of credible nonstrategic nuclear capabilities may cause opponents to be more confident in their ability to manage escalation, thus increasing the likelihood of adversary nuclear strikes in a regional conflict.

 

<Recommendations>

The next NDS should prioritize conventional-nuclear integration as follows:

 

Strategy

Refine the U.S. approach for winning conventional wars against nuclear-armed adversaries while favorably managing the risk of nuclear escalation.

Planning

Ensure that the operational plans for conflict with Russia and China are integrated among all relevant regional and functional commands and designed to deter nuclear escalation.

Improve the ability of combatant commands to adaptively develop courses of action to achieve U.S. objectives should an adversary employ nuclear weapons.

Doctrine

Establish joint doctrine for conventional-nuclear integration that sets standards for the content of professional military education and training and exercises.

Develop operational concepts that include dispersed bases, logistics hubs, and formations to reduce vulnerability to nuclear strikes.

Implement nuclear hardening standards on critical military platforms, weapons, and equipment.

Capabilities

Field the appropriate mix of nuclear, non-nuclear, and dual-use capabilities to deter conflict and escalation.

Conclusion

The next administration has an opportunity to build on the progress of the 2018 NDS by conducting an integrated deterrence and defense review. In this process, the next defense strategy should focus on developing concepts and capabilities for winning regional wars with nuclear-armed adversaries, while at the same time reducing the likelihood of escalation. These concepts should drive the conventional-nuclear integration that is needed in planning, doctrine, and capabilities.

 

About the Author

John K. Warden is a Research Staff Member in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), where he contributes to studies and analyses in support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and other national security agencies. The views, opinions, and findings expressed should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Department of Defense or IDA.

 

Conventional-Nuclear Integration to Strengthen Deterrence

Commentary by Doreen Horschig and Nicholas Adamopoulos

Published October 4, 2023, CSIS

https://www.csis.org/analysis/conventional-nuclear-integration-strengthen-deterrence

 

The United States and its allies should be prepared to fight a conventional war under the nuclear shadow. On September 18, the United States and South Korea met for the 23rd ROK-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue and issued a joint statement on the need for an enhanced, combined defense architecture through joined planning and execution of conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) efforts through the Nuclear Consultative Group. Recent national defense strategies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2022 Strategic Concept identify CNI as a potential solution to adversaries’ increasing consideration of theater nuclear use to win regional conflicts and a part of a broader approach to integrated deterrence. However, there is degree of ambiguity surrounding the definition of CNI, its components, capabilities, and limitations, as well as implications for extended deterrence and assurance.

 

Conventional-Nuclear Integration

CNI has not been explicitly defined in U.S. national security documents, but broadly speaking, it is the intersection of conventional and nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. U.S. CNI efforts require conventional forces, operating with nuclear considerations in mind, and nuclear forces that carry out deterrence operations. Those aim to prevent opponents from fielding conventional and unconventional forces and prepare U.S. forces to utilize nuclear strikes within an otherwise conventional conflict. Adversaries more commonly perceive CNI as the merging of conventional and nuclear forces to achieve objectives otherwise unachievable by one force alone.

 

Following the Cold War, the United States has largely maintained a firebreak between nuclear and conventional capabilities, systems, and strategies, but with some important exceptions like continued U.S. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) operations and exercises. However, this long-standing separation is coming under increasing pressure as the United States faces the prospect of regional competition with nuclear-armed adversaries. Russia and China have both invested heavily in theater-range, dual-capable missile systems, allowing them to threaten to employ a nuclear weapon within a regional conflict against the United States and its allies while attempting to remain below the threshold for a strategic nuclear exchange.

 

Thus, the prevailing question for U.S. analysts arises: How can the United States and its allies disincentivize adversary nuclear use while advancing U.S. regional goals, and what is the U.S. theory for victory if it does fight with conventional or nuclear means? The United States needs a strategy for winning limited regional conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries and has identified deeper CNI as a potential solution. The U.S. understanding of CNI consists of three major strategy and policy pieces: (1) the need to manage escalation in regional conflicts and deter adversary nuclear use (usually the concern of command-level decisionmakers), (2) the need to develop an integrated series of options to strengthen deterrence, and (3) the need to deny an adversary any advantages gained by nuclear use in a regional conflict through resiliency and preparedness. The implementation of these includes multiple ways and means of imposing significant costs in the context of a regional conflict with the goal of providing U.S. strategists with the widest possible range of response options, ranging from continuing to wage limited conventional conflict through conventional strikes with strategic effect, and if necessary, a nuclear response.

 

Some progress has been made on this issue; however, achieving an adequate level of CNI will take continued intense coordination both within the United States and with its allies. Operationalizing CNI remains an important focus of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review’s (NPR) implementation, however, putting thought into practice will.

 

How Russia and China Approach CNI

Russian and Chinese capabilities and strategies convey a belief that nuclear weapons can be used in theater to gain strategic advantage in conventional conflicts with the United States or its allies. Both adversaries appear to ascribe to similar theories of victory in limited regional conflicts that leverage the potential for nuclear use and perceived asymmetries of geography and stake to deter U.S. intervention and attempt to fracture U.S.-led alliances. Unlike the U.S. conception of CNI that focuses primarily on maximizing its ability to continue to pursue a conventional war even in a nuclear environment, Russia and China have instead focused on developing capabilities that can increase the credibility of limited nuclear threats without provoking a strategic nuclear response from the United States or its allies.

 

Russian strategy seeks to manage escalation to deter adversary intervention and aggression, prevent the conflict from expanding geographically, ensure state survival, and provide acceptable terms for conflict termination. Broadly speaking, Russia seeks first to achieve these aims by inducing fear in adversary decisionmakers, followed by increasingly damaging strikes on adversary targets while remaining below the threshold for an escalatory adversary response.

 

Russia has therefore invested heavily in developing a variety of advanced dual-capable nonstrategic weapon systems to bolster conventional military operations abroad, providing Moscow with the flexibility to manage crisis escalation and allow Russia to fight limited nuclear wars below the threshold for strategic nuclear employment. Russian systems include the 9M729/SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile, which prompted the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, as well as the KH-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile. Both are dual-capable theater-range missile systems with the ability to hold targets in Europe and Asia at risk. Russia also fields several conventional precision-strike missile systems, creating a range of capabilities that offers decisionmakers the flexibility to credibly threaten escalating costs (to include with nonnuclear systems) in regional conflicts while still maintaining a significant buffer between regional and major nuclear war.

 

New Chinese capabilities provide decisionmakers with a growing range of options in a regional conflict. China is pursuing a variety of dual-use systems that can hold U.S. assets and allies in the region at risk, and currently possesses a large variety of intermediate-range dual-use weapons systems. What China’s strategy is less clear. This raises important questions about how the United States and its allies would handle Chinese nuclear coercion aimed at deterring U.S. or allied intervention during a conflict, as well as the prospect for limited Chinese nuclear use to end a crisis on Chinese terms. In a Taiwan contingency, Chinese theater nuclear forces could deter U.S. intervention, deny the United States the ability to traverse the battlespace, and, if need be, end the conflict on terms favorable to Beijing.

 

The most recently fielded Chinese systems include the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile as well as the DF-17 hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, with a lack of clarity regarding how many of each are dedicated to conventional or nuclear missions. Furthermore, the China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force deploys conventional and dual-capable brigades together, forcing personnel to learn both nuclear and conventional operations. While China still publicly adheres to a no first-use policy, Chinese officials have privately caveated this policy in cases of conventional attacks on Chinese nuclear forces. This suggests a shift to a conventional-nuclear warfighting concept that provides the People’s Republic of China leadership with new strategic options that will increasingly cast a nuclear shadow over U.S. and allied military operations in the region.

 

Risks and Advantages of CNI

There are two essential challenges to the integration of conventional and nuclear planning. First, there is the danger of blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear forces through their entanglement (actual or perceived). The NPR emphasizes the limited role nuclear weapons play and that the president will only consider their potential employment in “extreme circumstances.” The integration of conventional and nuclear command and control systems warrants special attention because it could risk an entanglement of conventional and nuclear control. This could happen through platform ambiguity by combining conventional and nuclear systems on different vessels and commands that control several forces. This conventional-nuclear nexus is further complicated through other domain capabilities such as space and cyber, which introduce new dimensions of warfare by enabling the advanced surveillance, communication disruption, and precision targeting that needs to be considered for traditional military planning.

 

Second, the convergence of conventional and nuclear operations can affect the risk of nuclear escalation and the adversary’s willingness to resort to nuclear use. Effective communication of resolve and restraint to the adversary is challenging. On the one hand, the United States and its allies need to signal willingness to respond swiftly to the use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they should also show willingness of restraint if the adversary does not escalate the situation to nuclear use. Understanding how the adversary reacts to Washington’s CNI is crucial. For example, CNI might affect adversaries’ security postures and lead to further build-up of weapons system and more aggressive defense strategies. Any convergence could encourage additional changes in Russian and Chinese nuclear and defense policies.

 

In contrast, integration can strengthen the overall deterrence posture and manage escalation dynamics in a crisis and shape adversary perceptions of whether limited nuclear use would achieve its aims. Integration could help to signal to and convince adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression against the United States or its allies. Competitors are increasingly considering whether tactical nuclear use can shift a conflict to their advantage and CNI might be a useful tool to deter such escalation.

 

In addition, investments into CNI can help to advance the resiliency of conventional forces in case of nuclear use through dispersed operational bases (a steadfast component of nuclear deterrence), operational capability in a contaminated environment, and a hardening of C3 systems so they are sufficiently agile, resilient, and staffed. The Department of Defense (DOD) identifies resilient conventional forces as the keystone of this aspect of integrated deterrence, articulating that “the Joint Force must be able to survive, maintain cohesion, and continue to operate in the face of limited nuclear attacks. This form of resilience sends a distinct deterrence message to an adversary—that limited nuclear escalation will not render U.S., Allied, and partner forces incapable of achieving our warfighting aims.” If conventional forces are resilient, the adversary’s limited nuclear strikes will not have decisive, military advantage. For examples, NATO agreed to a new CBRN defense policy at the Madrid Summit in 2022 and Japan announced new investments into the resiliency of its defense facilities to ensure operations during wartime. Especially when allies and adversaries alike question the credibility of a nuclear response from the United States, can conventional resiliency and nuclear options then signal commitment to defending its allies and core interests?

 

Following this, if conventional resiliency is ensured, then CNI can give decisionmakers more flexibility and reduce the prospects for a limited nuclear war. This flexibility in response provides leaders with several options in reaction to a nuclear or other CBRN attack instead of ordering a massive nuclear counterattack. Especially after a possible nuclear strike on NC3 operations or nuclear forces, having command and force integration can increase response capabilities, providing more flexible and proportional response options. However, there are the named caveats such as entanglement that come with this integration.

 

CNI, Extended Deterrence, and Assurance

There has been a new focus on integration among the United States and its allies. For example, NATO’s 2022 strategic concept and the communiqué of the Vilnius summit both emphasized the increasing importance of greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components defense posture and the Washington Declaration between the United States and South Korea highlighted the increased cooperation between the conventional and nuclear forces: “the Alliance will work to enable joint execution and planning for ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency and improve combined exercises and training activities on the application of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.” Despite the rhetorical emphasis, there has not been a comprehensive review of efforts to integrate defense planning and operations with U.S. allies. The NATO concept reaffirmed the “unique and distinct role of nuclear deterrence” in a nod to some ongoing concerns with integration.

 

The question is whether CNI in allied postures can strengthen deterrence in the first place and achieve old and new objectives if it fails. Essentially, it is in the security interests of the United States and its allies to avert nuclear use, manage escalation, and communicate about a new, shared path to the restoration of deterrence if it fails. An important aspect of CNI is how the ally’s conventional forces contribute to a strong integrated U.S.-allied posture against combined threats that will include an adversary's conventional and nuclear forces. Providing assurance to U.S. allies requires that all forces can operate in regional conflicts and if necessary, in a nuclear environment. Conventional options to respond to a nuclear attack are an important part of the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear forces.

 

If integration is a feasible way for more adaptive allied planning in the event of adversarial nuclear use, then the question is if currently, geographic combatant commanders’ plans sufficiently address nuclear threats. Are there gaps and seams with U.S. nuclear plans and is planning synchronized with U.S. allies? Increased CNI in different theaters means the inclusion of theater commanders and allies in planning efforts that seek to better integrate and synchronize conventional forces with U.S. nuclear forces acting in their deterrent role. For example, to better prepare South Korea for a nuclear threat scenario, the alliance announced that ROK military personnel will join DOD courses and trainings, which will focus on how the alliance approaches nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, including through CNI. If integration is deemed a useful concept, putting it into practice will take continued and improved coordination both within the United States and with its allies.

 

Effective allied CNI requires improved, joint messaging. President Yoon emphasized a swift and overwhelming response, including the use of U.S. nuclear weapons, in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack, while President Biden's response was more ambiguous, suggesting the end of the North Korean regime and leaving room for a full range of options within a U.S. response. This example stresses the need for improved, coordinated allied messaging.

 

CNI can support U.S. assurance to allies if Washington’s nuclear planning is more aligned with allies’ conventional posture. For example, Japan’s recent National Security and National Defense Strategies suggest that Japan’s concerns have shifted from entrapment to abandonment, signaling an increased readiness to strengthen collaboration. In line with the announcement during the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in Washington in January 2023, the nations’ convergence of their national security and defense strategies signals to the adversary that their joined forces can survive and operate in, around, and through a potential theater nuclear attack.

 

The evolving geopolitical landscape demands a comprehensive evaluation of CNI as a component of U.S. and allied deterrence strategies. As the United States confronts nuclear-armed adversaries such as Russia and China, disincentivizing adversary nuclear use to advance regional goals becomes increasingly important. While challenges to CNI persist, its enhanced deterrence, resiliency, and response flexibility, are significant. Successful CNI development and implementation will require continued coordination, innovation, and synchronized messaging to ensure that the shadow of nuclear conflict remains a deterrent rather than a reality.

 

Doreen Horschig is an associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for the Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Nicholas Adamopoulos is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS.

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RELEASE, IMMEDIATE RELEASE, Sept. 18, 2023 | DOD

Joint Press Statement for the 23rd Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue

 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense (MND) held the 23rd Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) on September 18, 2023 in Seoul.

 

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Cara Allison Marshall, led the U.S. delegation and Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy (DEPMIN), Dr. Taekeun Heo, led the ROK delegation. Key senior U.S. and ROK defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue.

 

During the Security Policy Initiative session, both sides reaffirmed the shared U.S. and ROK goal of the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). They pledged to continue strengthening combined defense posture and capabilities to defend the ROK as well as deter conflict on the Peninsula.

 

The two sides shared their assessments of continued DPRK provocations and its efforts to diversify its delivery systems and advance its nuclear systems. The leaders committed to respond to DPRK provocations that undermine regional peace and stability through close and coordinated bilateral responses that demonstrate the strength of the Alliance. Both sides also reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of all United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions by the international community, particularly in light of the DPRK's failed space launch vehicle (SLV) launches in May and August.

 

Furthermore, the U.S. side reaffirmed its ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK, leveraging the full range of U.S. military capabilities (—including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities as well as advanced non-nuclear capabilities—) and reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies will result in the end of the Kim regime.

 

To this effect, the two sides assessed that the Ulchi Freedom Shield 23 (UFS23) exercise significantly improved the Alliance's crisis management and all-out war execution capabilities. The exercise was conducted in August of this year ((under a realistic operational environment)) that reflected the DPRK's advancing nuclear and missile threats as well as the possibility of a rapid transition to wartime. They also assessed that UFS23, (in conjunction with over 30 intensive Warrior Shield field training exercises), enhanced combined operation execution capabilities. Based on these outcomes, the two sides pledged to further strengthen combined exercises and training to stay responsive to the rapidly changing security environment on the Korean Peninsula.

 

(In commemorating the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and Armistice Agreement, ) the two sides agreed to co-host the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting in conjunction with the 55th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in November. The leaders acknowledged that the meeting would strengthen U.S and ROK solidarity with the UNC Member States who share core values of promoting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

 

On defense science and technology cooperation, both sides recognized the need to modernize the Alliance and expeditiously deliver game-changing technologies to the warfighter. To this end, the two sides pledged to continue strengthening cooperation based on shared strategic interests and enhance collaboration on joint research and development. The leaders underscored the importance of bolstering supply chain resiliency and strengthening the connection between U.S. and ROK defense industrial bases to enhance interoperability and interchangeability within the Alliance defense architecture.

 

Both sides acknowledged progress of the revision of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) based on guidance from U.S. and ROK strategic documents to effectively deter and respond to advancing DPRK nuclear and missile threats. The leaders shared a common understanding that the document, in conjunction with the progress / achieved through the newly established Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), will contribute to consultations and joint planning to this effect.

 

The leaders reviewed progress on the Program Analysis Working Group (PAWG), which aims to counter the DPRK's evolving missile threat and pledged to continue close collaboration. Both sides also agreed to initiate a joint study through the Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG) to further develop the Alliance's comprehensive counter-missile strategy.

 

The two sides commended the outcomes of the May 2023 Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG) meeting, which included discussions on plans to participate in a bilateral cyber exercise early next year. The leaders also acknowledged that the ROK-U.S. Space Cooperation table-top exercise (TTX) will highlight ways the two sides can work together to build a unified understanding of deterrence and threats in the space domain. The U.S. and ROK also pledged to continue close consultations on various space cooperation measures, through the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG).

 

During the Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Working Group (COTWG), both sides reviewed the progress in meeting the three conditions under the bilaterally approved Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) and reaffirmed a mutual commitment to strengthening the combined defense posture of the Alliance. In particular, the leaders noted the progress made in pursuing the transition of wartime OPCON this year, including the bilateral evaluation of COTP capabilities and systems, the transition of Combined Component Commands to standing component commands, and the assessment of the regional security environment. The two sides pledged to comprehensively review the results of the bilateral evaluation to pursue the F-CFC Full Operational Capability (FOC) certification and other subsequent tasks in a systematic and stable manner.

 

During the Executive Session, acting DASD Allison Marshall and DEPMIN Heo led discussions on the increasingly complex regional and global security environment. As such, the two leaders reaffirmed the importance of upholding the the rules-based international order and adhering to international law. They pledged to work closely together to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, including in the South China Sea and beyond.

 

Both delegations noted efforts to expand cooperation with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations and Pacific Island countries through the Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG) as part of efforts to implement the ROK Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.

 

The two sides also underscored the significance of the outcomes of the Trilateral Leaders' Summit at Camp David in August, which marked the beginning of a "new era of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation." The U.S. and ROK discussed ways to evolve defense trilateral cooperation into a comprehensive and multi-layered partnership that contributes to peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. Along with Japan, the U.S. and ROK discussed ongoing trilateral efforts to operationalize a real-time missile warning data sharing mechanism against DPRK threats by the end of 2023 and to institutionalize a multi-year trilateral military exercise plan.

 

During the meeting, both pledged that the U.S. Strategic Command and United States Forces Korea will closely collaborate with the ROK Strategic Command, which will be newly established, so that it can secure its role and status as a strategic unit. Both sides also agreed that U.S. and ROK forces will enhance the combined defense architecture of the Alliance by jointly developing planning and execution of Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) efforts through the NCG.

 

In conclusion, ROK and U.S. leaders assessed that the 23rd KIDD significantly contributed to reaffirming the strong cohesion of the Alliance, bolstering Alliance coordination, and strengthening the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture. Both delegations agreed that the KIDD has been a key mechanism in developing the Alliance into one of the most dynamic and premier alliances in the world over the last 70 years. Based on these outcomes, the two sides pledged to continue progress leading up to the 55th SCM and the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting, scheduled in November 2023.