바이든 경제 전략-재닛 옐런 & 제이크 설리번 연설 2제(202304)

1. Janet L. Yellen on 미중 경제관계(0420, SAIS)

Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the U.S. - China Economic Relationship at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (April 20, 2023)

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1425

 

Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the U.S. - China Economic Relationship at Johns Hopkins School of Advanc

SECRETARY STATEMENTS & REMARKS

Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the U.S. - China Economic Relationship at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

April 20, 2023  As Prepared for Delivery

Good morning, everyone. Dean Steinberg, thank you for your kind introduction. And thank you for your service to our country. I’m grateful for your contributions – not only during your time in government but here at SAIS.

I’m particularly glad to be at this institution. SAIS has one of the oldest and most extensive China studies programs in the country. In 1979, the United States established full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Just two years after, your university leaders had their own talks with their Chinese counterparts. The goal was to see whether Johns Hopkins and Nanjing University could partner together to educate future leaders.

The result: the establishment of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in 1986 – one of the first Western academic programs in modern China. This collaboration has been tested by the realities and complexities of our bilateral relationship. But I believe the students on this campus have served as a reminder of the respect that the American and Chinese people have for each other. And they demonstrate that people around the world can learn from one another if we communicate openly and honestly – even and especially when we disagree.

Since I began my career, the relationship between the United States and China has undergone a significant evolution. In the 1970s, our relationship was defined by rapprochement and gradual normalization. I watched President Nixon make his famous journey to China in 1972. And I heard our two countries begin to speak to each other again after decades of silence. In the years that followed, I saw China choose to implement market reforms and open itself to the global economy, driving an impressive rise into the second-largest economy in the world. Its development was supported by assistance from the World Bank and other international economic institutions. And the U.S. Congress and successive administrations played a major role in supporting China’s integration into global markets.

But in recent years, I’ve also seen China’s decision to pivot away from market reforms toward a more state-driven approach that has undercut its neighbors and countries across the world. This has come as China is striking a more confrontational posture toward the United States and our allies and partners – not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in Europe and other regions.

Today, we are at a critical time. The world is confronting the largest land war in Europe since World War II – just as it recovers from a once-in-a-century pandemic. Debt challenges are mounting for low- and middle-income countries. Some nations, including our own, have faced pressures on their economic and financial systems. And a U.N. report released last month indicates that the Earth is likely to cross a critical global warming threshold within the next decade – if no drastic action is taken.

Progress on these issues requires constructive engagement between the world’s two largest economies. Yet our relationship is clearly at a tense moment.

So today, I would like to discuss our economic relationship with China. My goal is to be clear and honest: to cut through the noise and speak to this essential relationship based on sober realities. 

The United States proceeds with confidence in its long-term economic strength. We remain the largest and most dynamic economy in the world. We also remain firm in our conviction to defend our values and national security. Within that context, we seek a constructive and fair economic relationship with China. Both countries need to be able to frankly discuss difficult issues. And we should work together, when possible, for the benefit of our countries and the world.

Our economic approach to China has <three principal objectives>.

First, we will secure our national security interests and those of our allies and partners, and we will protect human rights. We will clearly communicate to the PRC our concerns about its behavior. And we will not hesitate to defend our vital interests. (Even as our targeted actions may have economic impacts,) they are motivated solely by our concerns about our security and values. Our goal is not to use these tools to gain competitive economic advantage.

Second, we seek a healthy economic relationship with China: one that fosters growth and innovation in both countries. A growing China that plays by international rules is good for the United States and the world. Both countries can benefit from healthy competition in the economic sphere. But healthy economic competition – where both sides benefit – is only sustainable if that competition is fair. We will continue to partner with our allies to respond to China’s unfair economic practices. And we will continue to make critical investments at home – while engaging with the world to advance our vision for an open, fair, and rules-based global economic order.

Third, we seek cooperation on the urgent global challenges of our day. Since last year’s meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi, both countries have agreed to enhance communication around the macroeconomy and cooperation on issues like climate and debt distress. But more needs to be done. We call on China to follow through on its promise to work with us on these issues – not as a favor to us, but out of our joint duty and obligation to the world. Tackling these issues together will also advance the national interests of both of our countries.

I. STATE OF OUR ECONOMIES

Let me begin by discussing the state of our economies.

In recent years, many have seen conflict between the United States and China as increasingly inevitable. This was driven by fears, shared by some Americans, that the United States was in decline. And that China would imminently leapfrog us as the world’s top economic power – leading to a clash between nations.

It’s important to know this: pronouncements of U.S. decline have been around for decades. But they have always been proven wrong. The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to adapt and reinvent to face new challenges. This time will be no different – and the economic statistics show why.

Since the end of the Cold War, the American economy has grown faster than most other advanced economies. And over the past two years, we have mounted the strongest post-pandemic recovery among major advanced economies. Our unemployment rate is near historic lows. Real GDP per capita has reached an all-time high, and we have experienced the strongest two-year growth in new businesses on record.

This recovery is made possible by the strength of our economic fundamentals. Of course, this does not mean that our work is finished. Our top economic priority is to rein in inflation while protecting the economic gains of our recovery. A few weeks ago, the United States took decisive action to strengthen public confidence in the banking system after the failures of two regional institutions. The U.S. banking system remains sound, and we will take any necessary steps to ensure the United States continues to have the strongest and safest financial system in the world.

Over the past few decades, China has experienced an impressive economic rise. (Between 1980 and 2010), China’s economy grew by an average of 10 percent per year. This led to a truly remarkable feat: the rise of hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. China’s rapid catch-up growth was fueled by its opening-up to global trade and pursuit of market reforms. 

But like many countries, China today faces its share of near-term headwinds. This includes vulnerabilities in its property sector, high youth unemployment, and weak household consumption. In the longer term, China faces structural challenges. Its population is aging, and its workforce is already declining. And it has experienced a sharp reduction in productivity growth – amid its turn toward economic nationalism and policies that substantially increase the government’s intervention in the economy. None of these recent developments detract from China’s progress or the hard work and talent of the Chinese people. But China’s long-run growth rate seems likely to decline. 

Of course, an economy’s size is not the sole determinant of its strength. America is the largest economy in the world, but it also remains an unparalleled leader on a broad set of economic metrics – from wealth to technological innovation. U.S. GDP per capita is among the highest in the world and over five times as large as China’s. More than resources or geography, our country’s success can be attributed to our people, values, and institutions. American democracy, while not perfect, protects the free exchange of ideas and rule of law that is at the bedrock of sustainable growth. Our educational and scientific institutions lead the world. Our innovative culture is enriched by new immigrants, including those from China – enabling us to continue to generate world-class, cutting-edge products and industries.

Importantly, our economic power is amplified because we don’t stand alone. America values our close friends and partners in every region of the world, including the Indo-Pacific. In the 21st century, no country in isolation can create a strong and sustainable economy for its people. That’s why, under President Biden’s leadership, we’ve sought to rebuild and reinvest in our relationships with other countries.

All this to say: China’s economic growth need not be incompatible with U.S. economic leadership. The United States remains the most dynamic and prosperous economy in the world. We have no reason to fear healthy economic competition with any country.

II. SECURING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS

There are many challenges before us. But the President and I believe that China and the United States can manage our economic relationship responsibly. We can work toward a future in which both countries share in and drive global economic progress. Whether we can reach this vision depends in large part on what both countries do in the next few years.

Let me speak to our first objective: securing our national security and protecting human rights. These are areas where we will not compromise.

National Security

As in all of our foreign relations, national security is of paramount importance in our relationship with China. For example, we have made clear that safeguarding certain technologies from the PRC’s military and security apparatus is of vital national interest.

We have a broad suite of tools to achieve this aim. When necessary, we will take narrowly targeted actions. The U.S. government’s actions can come in the form of export controls. They can include additions to an entity list that restricts access / by those that provide support to the People’s Liberation Army. The Treasury Department has sanctions authorities to address threats (related to cybersecurity and China’s military-civil fusion). We also carefully review foreign investments in the United States for national security risks and take necessary actions to address any such risks. And we are considering a program to restrict certain U.S. outbound investments in specific sensitive technologies with significant national security implications.

(As we take these actions, let me be clear: these national security actions are not designed for us to gain a competitive economic advantage, or stifle China’s economic and technological modernization. Even though these policies may have economic impacts), they are driven by straightforward national security considerations. We will not compromise on these concerns, even when they force trade-offs with our economic interests.

There are key principles that guide our national security actions in the economic sphere.

First, these actions will be narrowly scoped and targeted to clear objectives. They will be calibrated to mitigate spillovers into other areas. Second, it is vital that these tools are easily understood and enforceable. And they must be readily adaptable when circumstances change. Third, (when possible), we will engage and coordinate with our allies and partners in the design and execution of our policies.

In addition, communication is essential to mitigating the risk of misunderstanding and unintended escalation. When we take national security actions, we will continue to outline our policy reasoning to other countries. We will listen and address concerns about unintended consequences.

Among our most pressing national security concerns is Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war against Ukraine(?). In my visit to Kyiv, I saw firsthand the brutality of Russia’s invasion. The Kremlin has bombed hospitals; destroyed cultural sites; attacked energy grids to cause widespread pain and suffering among civilians. Ending Russia’s war is a moral imperative. It will save many innocent lives. As I’ve said, it is also the single best thing we can do for the global economy. (To help end Russia’s war), we have mounted the swiftest, most unified, and most ambitious multilateral sanctions regime in modern history. Our broad coalition of partners has also provided assistance to Ukraine so it can defend itself.

China’s “no limits” partnership and support for Russia is a worrisome indication that it is not serious about ending the war. It is essential that China and other countries do not provide Russia with material support or assistance with sanctions evasion. We will continue to make the position of the United States extremely clear to Beijing and companies in its jurisdiction. The consequences of any violations would be severe.

Human Rights

Like national security, we will not compromise on the protection of human rights. This principle is foundational to how we engage with the world.

With our own eyes, the world has seen the PRC government escalate its repression at home. It has deployed technology to surveil and control the Chinese people – technology that it is now exporting to dozens of countries.

Human rights abuses violate the world’s moral conscience. They also violate the foundational principles of the United Nations – which virtually every country, including China, has signed onto. The United States will continue to use our tools to disrupt and deter human rights abuses wherever they occur around the globe.

In public and in private with Beijing, the United States has raised serious concerns about the PRC government’s abuses in Xinjiang, as well as in Hong Kong, Tibet, and other parts of China. And we have and will continue to take action. We have imposed sanctions on the PRC’s regional officials and companies for a range of human rights abuses – from torture to arbitrary detention. And we are restricting imports of goods produced with forced labor in Xinjiang.

Across these actions, we are working in concert with our allies – knowing that we are more effective when we all go at it together. 

III. TOWARDS HEALTHY ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT

As we protect our security interests and human rights values, we will also pursue our second objective: healthy economic engagement that benefits both countries.

Let’s start with the obvious. The U.S. and China are the two largest economies in the world. And we are deeply integrated with one another. Overall trade between our countries reached over $700 billion in 2021. We trade more with China than with any countries other than Canada and Mexico. American firms have extensive operations in China. Hundreds of Chinese firms are listed on our stock exchanges, which are part of the deepest and most liquid capital markets in the world. According to the Nature Index, the United States and China are each other’s most significant scientific collaborators. And China remains among the top sources for international students in the United States.

As I’ve said, the United States will assert ourselves when our vital interests are at stake. But we do not seek to “decouple” our economy from China’s. A full separation of our economies would be disastrous for both countries. It would be destabilizing for the rest of the world. Rather, we know that the health of the Chinese and U.S. economies is closely linked. A growing China that plays by the rules can be beneficial for the United States. For instance, it can mean rising demand for U.S. products and services and more dynamic U.S. industries.

Modern Supply-Side Investments at Home

In April 2021, I delivered my first major international economic policy speech as Treasury Secretary. I said that “credibility abroad begins with credibility at home.” At a basic level, America’s ability to compete in the 21st century turns on the choices that Washington makes – not those that Beijing makes.

Our economic strategy is centered around investing in ourselves – not suppressing or containing any other economy.

In the two years since my speech, the United States has pursued an economic agenda that I call modern supply-side economics. Our policies are designed to expand the productive capacity of the American economy. That is, to raise the ceiling for what our economy can produce. To do so, President Biden has signed three historic bills into law. We’ve enacted the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law – our generation’s most ambitious effort to modernize roads, bridges, and ports and broaden access to high-speed Internet. We’ve mounted a historic expansion of American semiconductor manufacturing through the CHIPS and Science Act. And we are making our nation’s largest investment in clean energy with the Inflation Reduction Act. These actions have fortified U.S. strength in the industries of the future. And they are lifting our long-term economic outlook.

Our Vision and Conditions for Healthy Economic Competition

It’s important to understand the nature of the healthy economic competition that the United States is pursuing. The United States does not seek competition that is winner-take-all. Instead, we believe that healthy economic competition with a fair set of rules can benefit both countries over time. A basic principle of economics is that sustained, repeated competition can lead to mutual improvement. Sports teams perform at a higher level when they consistently face top rivals. Firms produce better and cheaper goods when they compete for consumers. There is a world in which, as companies in the U.S. and China challenge each other, our economies can grow, standards of living can rise, and new innovations can bear fruit.

For example, China has benefited from American inventions like the personal computer and the MRI. In the same way, I believe that new scientific and medical developments from China can benefit Americans and the world – and spur us to undertake even more leading-edge research and innovation.

But this type of healthy competition is only sustainable if it is fair to both sides.

China has long used government support to help its firms gain market share at the expense of foreign competitors. But in recent years, its industrial policy has become more ambitious and complex. China has expanded support for its state-owned enterprises and domestic private firms to dominate foreign competitors. It has done so in traditional industrial sectors as well as emerging technologies. This strategy has been coupled with aggressive efforts to acquire new technological know-how and intellectual property – including through IP theft and other illicit means.

Government intervention can be justified in certain circumstances – such as to correct specific market failures. But China’s government employs non-market tools at a much larger scale and breadth than other major economies. China also imposes numerous barriers to market access for American firms that do not exist for Chinese businesses in the United States. For example, Beijing has often required foreign firms to transfer proprietary technology to domestic ones – simply to do business in China. These limits on access to the Chinese market tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese firms. Further, we are concerned about a recent uptick in coercive actions targeting U.S. firms, which comes at the same moment that China states that it is re-opening for foreign investment.

The actions of China’s government have had dramatic implications for the location of global manufacturing activity. And they have harmed workers and firms in the U.S. and around the world.

In certain cases, China has also exploited its economic power to retaliate against and coerce vulnerable trading partners. For example, it has used boycotts of specific goods as punishment in response to diplomatic actions by other countries. China’s pretext for these actions is often commercial. But its real goal is to impose consequences on choices that it dislikes – and to force sovereign governments to capitulate to its political demands.

The irony is that the open, fair, and rules-based global economy that the United States is calling for is the very same international order that helped make China’s economic transformation possible. And the inefficiencies and vulnerabilities generated by China’s unfair practices may end up hurting its own growth.

China’s senior officials have repeatedly spoken about the importance of allowing markets to play a “decisive role” in resource allocation – including in a speech just earlier this year. It would be better for China and the world if Beijing were to actually shift policies in these directions and meet its own stated reform ambitions.

As we press China on its unfair economic practices, we will continue to take coordinated actions with our allies and partners in response. A top priority for President Biden is the resilience of our critical supply chains. In certain sectors, China’s unfair economic practices have resulted in the over-concentration of the production of critical goods inside China. Under President Biden’s leadership, we are not only investing in manufacturing at home. We are also pursuing a strategy called “friendshoring” that is aimed at mitigating vulnerabilities that can lead to supply disruptions. We are creating redundancies in our critical supply chains with the large number of trading partners that we can count on.

Of course, we know that the best way for us to strengthen the global economic order is to show the world that it works. Our investments in the international financial institutions and efforts to deepen our ties around the world are enabling more people to benefit from the international economic system. We are also accelerating our commitments in the developing world. For example, the United States and the rest of the G7 aim to mobilize $600 billion in high-quality infrastructure investments by 2027. Our focus is on projects that generate positive economic returns and foster sustainable debt for these countries. And when the international system needs updating, we will not hesitate to do so. The United States is working with shareholders to evolve the multilateral development banks to better combat today’s pressing global challenges – like climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict.

LEADING TOGETHER ON GLOBAL CHALLENGES

As we set the terms of our economic engagement with China, we will also pursue our third objective: cooperation on major global challenges. It is important that we make progress on global issues regardless of our other disagreements. That’s what the world needs from its two largest economies.

As a foundation, we must continue to develop steady lines of communication between our countries for macroeconomic and financial cooperation. Economic developments in the United States and China can quickly ripple through global financial markets and the broader economy. We must maintain a robust exchange of views about how we are responding to economic shocks. My conversations with Vice Premier Liu He and China’s other senior officials have been a good start. I hope to build on them with my new counterpart.

Beyond the macroeconomy, there are two specific global priorities I’d like to highlight today: debt overhang and climate change. These issues can best be managed if both countries work together, and in concert with our allies and partners.

Debt Overhang

First, we must work together to help emerging markets and developing countries facing debt distress. The issue of global debt is not a bilateral issue between China and the United States. It is about responsible global leadership. China’s status as the world’s largest official bilateral creditor imposes on it the same inescapable set of responsibilities as those on other official bilateral creditors when debt cannot be fully repaid.

China’s participation is essential to meaningful debt relief. But for too long, it has not moved in a comprehensive and timely manner. It has served as a roadblock to necessary action.

Earlier this year, I felt the urgency of debt relief firsthand during my visit to Zambia. Government and business leaders spoke to me about how Zambia’s debt overhang has held back critical public and private investment and depressed economic development. But Zambia is not the only country in this situation. The IMF estimates that more than half of low-income countries are close to or already in debt distress. 

The United States has had extensive discussions with Beijing about the need for speedy debt treatment. We welcome China’s recent provision of specific and credible financing assurances for Sri Lanka, which has enabled the IMF to move forward with a program. But now, all of Sri Lanka’s bilateral creditors – including China – will need to deliver debt treatments in line with their assurances in a timely manner. We continue to urge China’s full participation to provide debt treatments in other cases in line with IMF parameters. This includes urgent cases like Zambia and Ghana.

Prompt action on debt is in China’s interest. Delaying needed debt treatments raises the costs both for borrowers and creditors. It worsens borrowers’ economic fundamentals and increases the amount of debt relief they will eventually need.

More broadly, there is considerable room for improvement in the international debt restructuring process. With the IMF and World Bank, we are working with a range of stakeholders to improve the Common Framework process for low-income countries and the debt treatment process more generally. As I heard from Zambian officials, solving these issues is a true test of multilateralism.

Climate Change

Second, we must work together to tackle longstanding global challenges that threaten us all. Climate change is at the top of that list. History shows us what our two countries can do: moments of climate cooperation between the United States and China have made global breakthroughs possible, including the Paris Agreement.

We have a joint responsibility to lead the way. China is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, followed by the United States. The U.S. will do its part. Over the past year, the United States has taken the boldest domestic climate action in our nation’s history. Our investments put us on track to meet U.S. commitments under the Paris Agreement and achieve net-zero by 2050. And they will have positive spillovers for the world, including through reductions in the costs of clean energy technologies. We are also working abroad to help countries make a just energy transition to reduce their carbon emissions. These transitions will also help expand energy access and provide economic opportunity for impacted communities and workers.

We expect China to deliver on its commitments in our Joint Glasgow Declaration. This includes meeting mitigation targets and ending overseas financing of unabated coal-fired power plants. China should also support developing countries and emerging markets in their clean energy transitions. Further, we look forward to working together to boost private capital flows as co-chairs of the G20 working group on sustainable finance.

We stand ready to work with China on the existential challenge of climate change. And we urge China to seriously engage with us and deliver on its commitments. The stakes are too high not to.

CONCLUSION

Some see the relationship between the U.S. and China through the frame of great power conflict: a zero-sum, bilateral contest where one must fall for the other to rise.

President Biden and I don’t see it that way. We believe that the world is big enough for both of us. China and the United States can and need to find a way to live together and share in global prosperity. We can acknowledge our differences, defend our own interests, and compete fairly. Indeed, the United States will continue to proceed with confidence about the fundamental strength of the American economy and the skill of American workers. But as President Biden said, “we share a responsibility…to prevent competition from becoming anything ever near conflict.”

Negotiating the contours of engagement between great powers is difficult. And the United States will never compromise on our security or principles. But we can find a way forward if China is also willing to play its part.

That’s why I plan to travel to China at the appropriate time. My hope is to engage in an important and substantive dialogue on economic issues with my new Chinese government counterpart following the political transition in Beijing. I believe this dialogue can help lay the groundwork for responsibly managing our bilateral relationship and cooperating on areas of shared challenge to our nations and the world.

As you know, I am an economist by trade. Economics is popularly seen as a field concerning the structure and performance of entire economies. But at its most granular level, economics is much more foundational. It’s the study of the choices that people make. Specifically, how people make choices under specific circumstances – of scarcity, of risk, and sometimes, of stress. And how choices by individuals and firms affect one another, and how they add up to a national or global picture.

In other words, an economy is just an aggregate of choices that people make.

The relationship between the United States and China is the same. Our path is not preordained, and it is not destined to be costly. The trajectory of this relationship is the aggregate of choices that all of us in these two great powers make over time – including when to cooperate, when to compete, and when to recognize that even amid our competition, we have a shared interest in peace and prosperity.

The United States believes that responsible economic relations between the U.S. and China is in the self-interest of our peoples. It is the hope and expectation of the world. And at this moment of challenge, I believe it must be the choice that both countries – the United States and China – make.

Thank you.

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2. Jake Sullivan on 바이든 행정부 세계경제 아젠다(0427, 브루킹스)

The Biden administration’s international economic agenda: A conversation with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan

https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-biden-administrations-international-economic-agenda-a-conversation-with-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan/

The Biden administration’s international economic agenda: A conversation with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan

 

 

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APRIL 27, 2023

Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution

 

AS DELIVERED

I want to start by thanking all of you for indulging a National Security Advisor to discuss economics.
As most of you know, Secretary Yellen gave an important speech just down the street last week on our economic policy with respect to China.  Today I’d like to zoom out to our broader international economic policy, particularly as it relates to President Biden’s core commitment—indeed, to his daily direction to us—to more deeply integrate domestic policy and foreign policy.
After the Second World War, the United States led a fragmented world to build a new international economic order.  It lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.  It sustained thrilling technological revolutions.  And it helped the United States and many other nations around the world achieve new levels of prosperity.
But the last few decades revealed cracks in those foundations.  A shifting global economy left many working Americans and their communities behind.
A financial crisis shook the middle class.  A pandemic exposed the fragility of our supply chains.  A changing climate threatened lives and livelihoods.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscored the risks of overdependence.
So this moment demands that we forge a new consensus. 
That’s why the United States, under President Biden, is pursuing a modern industrial and innovation strategy—both at home and with partners around the world.  One that invests in the sources of our own economic and technological strength, that promotes diversified and resilient global supply chains, that sets high standards for everything from labor and the environment to trusted technology and good governance, and that deploys capital to deliver on public goods like climate and health. 

Now, the idea that a “new Washington consensus,” as some people have referred to it, is somehow America alone, or America and the West to the exclusion of others, is just flat wrong.
This strategy will build a fairer, more durable global economic order, for the benefit of ourselves and for people everywhere.
So today, what I want to do is lay out what we are endeavoring to do.  And I’ll start by defining the challenges as we see them—the challenges that we face.  To take them on, we’ve had to revisit some old assumptions.  Then I’ll walk through, step by step, how our approach is tailored to meeting those challenges.
When President Biden came into office more than two years ago, the country faced, from our perspective, four fundamental challenges.

First, America’s industrial base had been hollowed out.
The vision of public investment that had energized the American project in the postwar years—and indeed for much of our history—had faded.  It had given way to a set of ideas that championed tax cutting and deregulation, privatization over public action, and trade liberalization as an end in itself. 
There was one assumption at the heart of all of this policy: that markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently—no matter what our competitors did, no matter how big our shared challenges grew, and no matter how many guardrails we took down.
Now, no one—certainly not me—is discounting the power of markets. But in the name of oversimplified market efficiency, entire supply chains of strategic goods—along with the industries and jobs that made them—moved overseas.  And the postulate that deep trade liberalization would help America export goods, not jobs and capacity, was a promise made but not kept.  
Another embedded assumption was that the type of growth did not matter.  All growth was good growth.  So, various reforms combined and came together to privilege some sectors of the economy, like finance, while other essential sectors, like semiconductors and infrastructure, atrophied.  Our industrial capacity—which is crucial to any country’s ability to continue to innovate—took a real hit.  
The shocks of a global financial crisis and a global pandemic laid bare the limits of these prevailing assumptions.

The second challenge we faced was adapting to a new environment defined by geopolitical and security competition, with important economic impacts.
Much of the international economic policy of the last few decades had relied upon the premise that economic integration would make nations more responsible and open, and that the global order would be more peaceful and cooperative—that bringing countries into the rules-based order would incentivize them to adhere to its rules.
It didn’t turn out that way.  In some cases it did, and in lot of cases it did not.
By the time President Biden came into office, we had to contend with the reality that a large non-market economy had been integrated into the international economic order in a way that posed considerable challenges. 

The People’s Republic of China continued to subsidize at a massive scale both traditional industrial sectors, like steel, as well as key industries of the future, like clean energy, digital infrastructure, and advanced biotechnologies.  America didn’t just lose manufacturing—we eroded our competitiveness in critical technologies that would define the future.
Economic integration didn’t stop China from expanding its military ambitions in the region, or stop Russia from invading its democratic neighbors.  Neither country had become more responsible or cooperative. 

And ignoring economic dependencies that had built up over the decades of liberalization had become really perilous—from energy uncertainty in Europe to supply-chain vulnerabilities in medical equipment, semiconductors, and critical minerals.  These were the kinds of dependencies that could be exploited for economic or geopolitical leverage.

The third challenge we faced was an accelerating climate crisis and the urgent need for a just and efficient energy transition.
When President Biden came into office, we were falling dramatically short of our climate ambitions, without a clear pathway to abundant supplies of stable and affordable clean energy, despite the best efforts of the Obama-Biden Administration to make significant headway.
Too many people believed that we had to choose between economic growth and meeting our climate goals.
President Biden has seen things totally differently.  As he’s often said, when he hears “climate,” he thinks “jobs.”  He believes that building a twenty-first-century clean-energy economy is one of the most significant growth opportunities of the twenty-first century—but that to harness that opportunity, America needs a deliberate, hands-on investment strategy to pull forward innovation, drive down costs, and create good jobs.

Finally, we faced the challenge of inequality and its damage to democracy.
Here, the prevailing assumption was that trade-enabled growth would be inclusive growth—that the gains of trade would end up getting broadly shared within nations. But the fact is that those gains failed to reach a lot of working people.  The American middle class lost ground while the wealthy did better than ever.  And American manufacturing communities were hollowed out while cutting-edge industries moved to metropolitan areas.
Now, the drivers of economic inequality—as many of you know even better than I—are complex, and they include structural challenges like the digital revolution.  But key among these drivers are decades of trickle-down economic policies—policies like regressive tax cuts, deep cuts to public investment, unchecked corporate concentration, and active measures to undermine the labor movement that initially built the American middle class.
Efforts to take a different approach during the Obama Administration—including efforts to pass policies to address climate change, invest in infrastructure, expand the social safety net, and protect workers’ rights to organize—were stymied by Republican opposition.

And frankly, our domestic economic policies also failed to fully account for the consequences of our international economic policies. 
For example, the so-called “China shock” that hit pockets of our domestic manufacturing industry especially hard—with large and long-lasting impacts—wasn’t adequately anticipated and wasn’t adequately addressed as it unfolded.
And collectively, these forces had frayed the socioeconomic foundations on which any strong and resilient democracy rests. 
Now, these four challenges were not unique to the United States.  Established and emerging economies were confronting them, too—in some cases more acutely than we are. 

When President Biden came to office, he knew the solution to each of these challenges was to restore an economic mentality that champions building.  And that is the core of our economic approach. To build.  To build capacity, to build resilience, to build inclusiveness, at home and with partners abroad.  The capacity to produce and innovate, and to deliver public goods like strong physical and digital infrastructure and clean energy at scale.  The resilience to withstand natural disasters and geopolitical shocks. And the inclusiveness to ensure a strong, vibrant American middle class and greater opportunity for working people around the world.
All of that is part of what we have called a foreign policy for the middle class.

(The first step) is laying a new foundation at home—with a modern American industrial strategy. 
My friend and former colleague Brian Deese has spoken about this new industrial strategy at some length, and I commend his remarks to you, because they are better than any remarks I could give on the subject.  But in summary:
A modern American industrial strategy identifies specific sectors that are foundational to economic growth, strategic from a national security perspective, and where private industry on its own isn’t poised to make the investments needed to secure our national ambitions.  
It deploys targeted public investments in these areas that unlock the power and ingenuity of private markets, capitalism, and competition to lay a foundation for long-term growth.
It helps enable American business to do what American business does best—innovate, scale, and compete.
This is about crowding in private investment—not replacing it.  It’s about making long-term investments in sectors vital to our national wellbeing—not picking winners and losers.
And it has a long tradition in this country.  In fact, even as the term “industrial policy” went out of fashion, in some form it remained quietly at work for America—from DARPA and the Internet to NASA and commercial satellites.
Now, looking over the course of the last couple of years, the initial results of this strategy are remarkable. 

The Financial Times has reported that large-scale investments in semiconductor and clean-energy production have already surged 20-fold since 2019, and a third of the investments announced since August involve a foreign investor investing here in the United States.
We’ve estimated that the total public capital and private investment from President Biden’s agenda will amount to some $3.5 trillion over the next decade. 
Consider semiconductors, which are as essential to our consumer goods today as they are to the technologies that will shape our future, from artificial intelligence to quantum computing to synthetic biology.
America now manufactures only around 10 percent of the world’s semiconductors, and production—in general and especially when it comes to the most advanced chips—is geographically concentrated elsewhere. 
This creates a critical economic risk and a national security vulnerability.  So thanks to the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act, we’ve already seen an orders-of-magnitude increase in investment into America’s semiconductor industry.  And it’s still early days. 
Or consider critical minerals—the backbone of the clean-energy future.  Today, the United States produces only 4 percent of the lithium, 13 percent of the cobalt, 0 percent of the nickel, and 0 percent of the graphite required to meet current demand for electric vehicles.  Meanwhile, more than 80 percent of critical minerals are processed by one country, China.
Clean-energy supply chains are at risk of being weaponized in the same way as oil in the 1970s, or natural gas in Europe in 2022.  So through the investments in the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, we’re taking action.
At the same time, it isn’t feasible or desirable to build everything domestically.  Our objective is not autarky—it’s resilience and security in our supply chains.

Now, building our domestic capacity is the starting point.  But the effort extends beyond our borders.  And this brings me to (the second step) in our strategy: working with our partners to ensure they are building capacity, resilience, and inclusiveness, too.
Our message to them has been consistent:  We will unapologetically pursue our industrial strategy at home—but we are unambiguously committed to not leaving our friends behind.  We want them to join us.  In fact, we need them to join us.
Creating a secure and sustainable economy in the face of the economic and geopolitical realities will require all of our allies and partners to do more—and there’s no time to lose.  For industries like semiconductors and clean energy, we’re nowhere near the global saturation point of investments needed, public or private. 
Ultimately, our goal is a strong, resilient, and leading-edge techno-industrial base that the United States and its like-minded partners, established and emerging economies alike, can invest in and rely upon together.
President Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen talked about this here in Washington last month.
They released a very important statement, which, if you haven’t read it, I really encourage you to read.  At its heart, what the statement said was the following: bold public investments in our respective industrial capacity needs to be at the heart of the energy transition.  And President von der Leyen and President Biden committed to working together to ensure that the supply chains of the future are resilient, secure, and reflective of our values—including on labor.
They laid out practical steps in the statement to achieve those goals—like aligning respective clean-energy incentives on each side of the Atlantic and launching a negotiation on supply chains for critical minerals and batteries.

Shortly after that, President Biden went to Canada.  He and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau established a task force to accelerate cooperation between Canada and the United States toward exactly the same end: ensuring our clean-energy supply and creating middle-class jobs on both sides of the border.
And just a few days after that, the United States and Japan signed an agreement deepening our cooperation on critical-mineral supply chains.
So we are leveraging the Inflation Reduction Act to build a clean-energy manufacturing ecosystem rooted in supply chains here in North America, and extending to Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. 
This is how we will turn the IRA from a source of friction into a source of strength and reliability.  And I suspect you’ll hear more on this at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima next month.
Now, our cooperation with partners is not limited to clean energy.

For example, we’re working with partners—in Europe, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and India—to coordinate our approaches to semiconductor incentives.
Analyst projections on where semiconductor investments will happen over the next three years have shifted dramatically, with the United States and key partners now topping the charts.
Let me also underscore that our cooperation with partners is not limited to advanced industrial democracies.
Fundamentally, we have to—and we intend to—dispel the notion that America’s most important partnerships are only with established economies.  Not just by saying it, but by proving it. Proving it with India—on everything from hydrogen to semiconductors.  Proving it with Angola—on carbon-free solar power.  Proving it with Indonesia—on its Just Energy Transition Partnership.  Proving it with Brazil—on climate-friendly growth.

This brings me to the third step in our strategy: moving beyond traditional trade deals to innovative new international economic partnerships focused on the core challenges of our time.
The main international economic project of the 1990s was reducing tariffs.  On average, applied U.S. tariff rates were nearly cut in half during the 1990s.  Today, in 2023, our trade-weighted average tariff rate is 2.4 percent—which is low historically, and relative to other countries.
Of course, those tariffs aren’t uniform, and there is still work to be done bringing tariff levels down in many other countries.  As Ambassador Tai has said, “We have not sworn off market liberalization.”  We do intend to pursue modern trade agreements.  But to define or measure our entire policy based on tariff reduction misses something important.
Asking what our trade policy is now—narrowly framed as plans to reduce tariffs further—is simply the wrong question.  The right question is: how does trade fit into our international economic policy, and what problems is it seeking to solve?
The project of the 2020s and the 2030s is different from the project of the 1990s. 
We know the problems we need to solve today:  Creating diversified and resilient supply chains.   Mobilizing public and private investment for a just clean energy transition and sustainable economic growth.  Creating good jobs along the way, family-supporting jobs.  Ensuring trust, safety, and openness in our digital infrastructure.  Stopping a race-to-the-bottom in corporate taxation.  Enhancing protections for labor and the environment.  Tackling corruption.  That is a different set of fundamental priorities than simply bringing down tariffs.

And we have designed the elements of an ambitious regional economic initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, to focus on those problems—and solving those problems.  We’re negotiating chapters with thirteen Indo-Pacific nations that will hasten the clean-energy transition, implement tax fairness and fight corruption, set high standards for technology, and ensure more resilient supply chains for critical goods and inputs.  
Let me speak a bit more concretely.  Had IPEF been in place when COVID wreaked havoc on our supply chains and factories sat idling, we would have been able to react more quickly— companies and governments together— pivoting to new options for sourcing and sharing data in real-time.  That’s what a new approach can look like on that issue—as on many others.

Our new Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, launched with a number of our key partners here in the Americas, is aimed at the same basic set of objectives.

Meanwhile, through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, and through our trilateral coordination with Japan and Korea, we are coordinating on our industrial strategies to complement one another, and avert a race-to-the-bottom by all competing for the same targets.
Some have looked at these initiatives and said, “but they aren’t traditional FTAs.”  That’s exactly the point.  For the problems we are trying to solve today, the traditional model doesn’t cut it. 
The era of after-the-fact policy patches(사후약방문) and vague promises of redistribution is over.  We need a new approach. 

Simply put: In today’s world, trade policy needs to be about more than tariff reduction, and trade policy needs to be fully integrated into our economic strategy, at home and abroad.

At the same time, the Biden Administration is developing a new global labor strategy that advances workers’ rights through diplomacy, and we will be unveiling this strategy in the weeks ahead.  
It builds on tools like the rapid-response labor mechanism in USMCA that enforces workers’ association and collective-bargaining rights.  Just this week, in fact, we resolved our eighth case with an agreement that improved working conditions—a win-win for Mexican workers and American competitiveness.
We’re in the process now of continuing to lead a historic agreement with 136 countries to finally end the race-to-the-bottom on corporate taxes that hurt middle-class and working people.  Now Congress needs to follow through with the implementing legislation, and we are working them to do exactly that.
And we’re taking another kind of new approach that we think a critical blueprint for the future—linking trade and climate in a way that has never been done before.  The Global Arrangement on Steel and Aluminum that we’re negotiating with the European Union could be the first major trade deal to tackle both emissions intensity and over-capacity.  And if we can apply it to steel and aluminum, we can look at how it applies to other sectors as well.  We can help create a virtuous cycle and ensure our competitors aren’t gaining an advantage by degrading the planet.

Now, for those who have posed the question, the Biden Administration is still committed to the WTO and the shared values upon which it is based: fair competition, openness, transparency, and the rule of law.  But serious challenges, most notably nonmarket economic practices and policies, threaten those core values.  So that’s why we’re working with so many other WTO members to reform the multilateral trading system so that it benefits workers, accommodates legitimate national security interests, and confronts pressing issues that aren’t fully embedded in the current WTO framework, like sustainable development and the clean-energy transition.

In sum, in a world being transformed by that clean energy transition, by dynamic emerging economies, by a quest for supply chain resilience—by digitization, by artificial intelligence, and by a revolution in biotechnology—the game is not the same.
Our international economic policy has to adapt to the world as it is, so we can build the world that we want.

This brings me to the fourth step in our strategy: mobilizing trillions in investment into emerging economies—with solutions that those countries are fashioning on their own, but with capital enabled by a different brand of U.S. diplomacy.
We’ve launched a major effort to evolve the multilateral development banks so they are up to the challenges of today.  2023 is a big year for this.
As Secretary Yellen has outlined, we need to update the banks’ operating models—especially the World Bank but the regional development banks as well.  We need to stretch their balance sheets to address climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict.  And we have to expand access to concessional, high-quality finance for low income and for middle-income countries as they deal with challenges that span beyond any single nation’s borders. 
We saw an early down payment on this agenda last month, but we will need to do much more.
And we’re very excited for Ajay Banga’s new leadership at the World Bank to make this vision a reality. 
At the same time as we are evolving the multilateral development banks, we’ve also launched a major effort to close the infrastructure gap in low- and middle-income countries.  We call it the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment—PGII.  PGII will mobilize hundreds of billions of dollars in energy, physical, and digital infrastructure financing between now and the end of the decade.

And unlike the financing that comes in the Belt and Road Initiative, projects under PGII are transparent and high-standard and in service of long-term, inclusive, and sustainable growth.  And in just under a year since this initiative launched, we have already delivered significant investments in everything from the mines needed to power electric vehicles to global subsea telecom cables. 
At the same time, we’re also committed to addressing the debt distress faced by an increasingly large number of vulnerable countries.  We need to see genuine relief, not just “extending and pretending.”  And we need to see all bilateral official and private creditors share the burden. 
That includes China, which has worked to build its influence through massive lending to the emerging world, almost always with strings attached.  We share the view of many others that China now needs to step up as a constructive force in assisting debt-stressed countries.

Finally, we are protecting our foundational technologies with a small yard and high fence.(the Step five)
As I’ve argued before, our charge is to usher in a new wave of the digital revolution—one that ensures that next-generation technologies work for, not against, our democracies and our security.
We’ve implemented carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China.  Those restrictions are premised on straightforward national security concerns.  Key allies and partners have followed suit, consistent with their own security concerns.
We’re also enhancing the screening of foreign investments in critical areas relevant to national security.  And we’re making progress in addressing outbound investments in sensitive technologies with a core national security nexus.
These are tailored measures.  They are not, as Beijing says, a “technology blockade.”  They are not targeting emerging economies.  They are focused on a narrow slice of technology and a small number of countries intent on challenging us militarily.

A word on China more broadly.  As President von der Leyen put it recently, we are for de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling.  We’ll keep investing in our own capacities, and in secure, resilient supply chains.  We’ll keep pushing for a level playing field for our workers and companies and defending against abuses.
Our export controls will remain narrowly focused on technology that could tilt the military balance.  We are simply ensuring that U.S. and allied technology is not used against us.  We are not cutting off trade.
In fact, the United States continues to have a very substantial trade and investment relationship with China.  Bilateral trade between the United States and China set a new record last year.
Now, (when you zoom out from economics,) we are competing with China on multiple dimensions, but we are not looking for confrontation or conflict.  We’re looking to manage competition responsibly and seeking to work together with China where we can. 

(중국과 협력할 4대 분야: 기후변화, 거시경제 안정, 보건 안보, 식량 안보)President Biden has made clear that the United States and China can and should work together on global challenges like climate, like macroeconomic stability, health security, and food security. 
Managing competition responsibly ultimately takes two willing parties.  It requires a degree of strategic maturity to accept that we must maintain open lines of communication even as we take actions to compete.
As Secretary Yellen said last week in her speech on this topic, we can defend our national security interests, have a healthy economic competition, and work together where possible, but China has to be willing to play its part.
So, what does success look like?

The world needs an international economic system that works for our wage-earners, works for our industries, works for our climate, works for our national security, and works for the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries.
That means replacing a singular approach focused the oversimplified assumptions that I set out at the top of my speech with one that encourages targeted and necessary investments in places that private markets are ill-suited to address on their own—even as we continue to harness the power of markets and integration. 
It means providing space for partners around the world to restore the compacts between governments and their voters and workers. 
It means grounding this new approach in deep cooperation and transparency to ensure that our investments and those of partners are mutually reinforcing and beneficial.
And it means returning to the core belief we first championed 80 years ago: that America should be at the heart of a vibrant, international financial system that enables partners around the world to reduce poverty and enhance shared prosperity.  And that a functioning social safety net for the world’s most vulnerable countries is essential to our own core interests.
It also means building new norms that allow us to address the challenges posed by the intersection of advanced technology and national security, without obstructing broader trade and innovation.
This strategy will take resolve—it will take a dedicated commitment to overcoming the barriers that have kept this country and our partners from building rapidly, efficiently, and fairly as we were able to do in the past.

But it is the surest path to restoring the middle class, to producing a just and effective clean-energy transition, to securing critical supply chains, and, through all of this, to repairing faith in democracy itself.
As always, we need the full and bipartisan partnership of Congress if we are going to succeed.
We need support from Congress to revive America’s unique capacity to attract and retain the brightest talent from around the world. We need the Hill’s full partnership in our reform initiatives in development finance.
And we need to double down on our investments in infrastructure, innovation, and clean energy. Our national security and our economic vitality depend on it.

Let me close with this. 
President Kennedy was fond of saying that “a rising tide lifts all boats.”  Over the years, advocates of trickle-down economics appropriated this phrase for their own uses. 
But President Kennedy wasn’t saying what’s good for the wealthy is good for the working class.  He was saying we’re all in this together.
And look at what he said next: “If one section of the country is standing still, then sooner or later a dropping tide drops all the boats.”
That’s true for our country.  That’s true for our world.  End economically, over time, we’re going to rise—or fall—together. 
And that goes for the strength of our democracies as well as for the strength of our economies.
As we pursue this strategy at home and abroad, there will be reasonable debate.  And this is going to take time.  The international order that emerged after the end of the Second World War and then the Cold War were not built overnight.  Neither will this one. 
But together, we can work to lift up all of America’s people, communities, and industries, and we can do the same with our friends and partners everywhere around the globe as well.  
This is a vision the Biden Administration must and will fight to achieve. 
This is what is guiding us as we make our policy decisions at the intersection of economics, national security, and democracy. 
And this is the work that we will do not just as a government, but with every element of the United States, and with the support and help of partners both in government and out of government around the world.  END

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Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on the U.S. - China Economic Relationship at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
April 20, 2023 (As Prepared for Delivery)

안녕하세요, 여러분. 스타인버그 학장님, 친절하게 소개해 주셔서 감사합니다. 그리고 조국을 위해 봉사해 주셔서 감사합니다. 공직에 계실 때뿐만 아니라 여기 SAIS에서도 많은 기여를 해주셔서 감사합니다.
특히 이 학교에 오게돼 기쁩니다. SAIS는 미국에서 가장 오래되고 광범위한 중국 연구 프로그램 중 하나를 보유하고 있습니다. 1979년 미국은 중화인민공화국과 완전한 외교 관계를 수립했습니다. 그로부터 불과 2년 후, 존스홉킨스 대학의 지도자들은 중국 측 인사들과 직접 회담을 가졌습니다. 존스홉킨스와 난징대학이 미래의 지도자를 교육하기 위해 협력할 수 있는지 알아보는 것이 목표였습니다.
그 결과 1986년 현대 중국 최초의 서양 학술 프로그램 중 하나인 홉킨스-난징 센터가 설립되었습니다. 이 협력은 양국 관계의 현실과 복잡성에 의해 시험대에 올랐습니다. 하지만 저는 이 캠퍼스의 학생들이 미국과 중국 국민이 서로를 존중하고 있음을 상기시키는 역할을 해왔다고 믿습니다. 특히 서로 의견이 다를 때에도 공개적이고 정직하게 소통하면 전 세계 사람들이 서로에게서 배울 수 있다는 것을 보여줬습니다.
제가 커리어를 시작한 이래로 미국과 중국의 관계는 상당한 진화를 거듭해 왔습니다. 1970년대에 양국 관계는 화해와 점진적인 정상화로 정의되었습니다. 저는 1972년 닉슨 대통령이 그 유명한 중국 방문을 하는 것을 지켜보았습니다. 그리고 양국이 수십 년간의 침묵을 깨고 다시 대화하기 시작했다는 소식을 들었습니다. 그 후 몇 년 동안 저는 중국이 시장 개혁을 실행하고 세계 경제에 개방하여 세계 2위의 경제 대국으로 부상하는 것을 보았습니다. 중국의 발전은 세계은행과 기타 국제 경제 기관의 지원으로 뒷받침되었습니다. 그리고 미국 의회와 역대 행정부도 중국의 글로벌 시장 통합을 지원하는 데 중요한 역할을 했습니다.

그러나 최근 몇 년 동안 저는 중국이 시장 개혁에서 벗어나 국가 주도의 접근 방식으로 전환하기로 한 결정이 전 세계 이웃 국가와 국가들을 약화시키는 것을 목격했습니다. 이는 중국이 인도 태평양뿐만 아니라 유럽 및 기타 지역에서 미국과 우리의 동맹국 및 파트너에 대해 더 대결적 태도를 취하고 있기 때문에 발생했습니다.
지금 우리는 중요한 시기에 있습니다. 세계는 한 세기에 한 번뿐인 팬데믹에서 회복하는 동시에 2차 세계대전 이후 유럽에서 가장 큰 규모의 지상전에 직면하고 있습니다. 저소득 및 중간 소득 국가들의 부채 문제는 점점 더 커지고 있습니다. 우리나라를 포함한 일부 국가는 경제 및 금융 시스템에 대한 압박에 직면해 있습니다. 그리고 지난달 발표된 유엔 보고서에 따르면 과감한 조치가 취해지지 않는다면 지구는 향후 10년 이내에 심각한 지구 온난화 임계점을 넘을 가능성이 높습니다.
이러한 문제에 대한 진전을 이루기 위해서는 세계 최대 경제대국 간의 건설적인 참여가 필요합니다. 하지만 현재 양국의 관계는 분명 긴장된 상태입니다.
그래서 오늘 저는 중국과의 경제 관계에 대해 말씀드리고자 합니다. 저의 목표는 명확하고 정직하게, 즉 잡음을 걷어내고 냉정한 현실을 바탕으로 이 본질적인 관계에 대해 이야기하는 것입니다. 
미국은 장기적인 경제력에 대한 확신을 가지고 정책을 추진하고 있습니다. 미국은 여전히 세계에서 가장 크고 역동적인 경제대국입니다. 또한 우리의 가치와 국가 안보를 수호하겠다는 신념도 확고합니다. 이러한 맥락에서 우리는 중국과 건설적이고 공정한 경제 관계를 추구합니다. 양국은 어려운 문제에 대해 솔직하게 논의할 수 있어야 합니다. 그리고 가능하면 양국과 세계의 이익을 위해 함께 협력해야 합니다.

중국에 대한 우리의 경제 접근 방식에는 세 가지 주요 목표가 있습니다.
첫째, 우리는 미국과 동맹국 및 파트너의 국가 안보 이익을 확보하고 인권을 보호할 것입니다.( 우리는 중국의 행동에 대한 우리의 우려를 중국에 분명히 전달할 것입니다. 그리고 우리의 중대한 이익을 지키기 위해 주저하지 않을 것입니다. 우리의 표적 행동이 경제적 영향을 미칠 수 있지만, 이는 오로지 우리의 안보와 가치에 대한 우려에서 비롯된 것입니다.) 우리의 목표는 경쟁 우위를 확보하기 위해 이러한 도구를 사용하는 것이 아닙니다.
둘째, 우리는 중국과의 건강한 경제 관계, 즉 양국의 성장과 혁신을 촉진하는 관계를 추구합니다. 국제 규칙을 준수하며 성장하는 중국은 미국과 전 세계에 좋은 일입니다. 양국은 경제 영역에서 건전한 경쟁을 통해 이익을 얻을 수 있습니다. 그러나 양국이 모두 이익을 얻는 건강한 경제 경쟁은 그 경쟁이 공정할 때만 지속 가능합니다. 우리는 동맹국들과 계속 협력하여 중국의 불공정 경제 관행에 대응할 것입니다. 그리고 우리는 개방적이고 공정하며 규칙에 기반한 글로벌 경제 질서에 대한 우리의 비전을 진전시키기 위해 전 세계와 협력하면서 국내적으로 중요한 투자를 계속할 것입니다.
셋째, 우리는 오늘날의 시급한 글로벌 과제에 대한 협력을 모색합니다. 작년 바이든 대통령과 시 주석의 회담 이후 양국은 거시 경제에 대한 소통과 기후 및 부채 문제와 같은 문제에 대한 협력을 강화하기로 합의했습니다. 그러나 더 많은 일이 필요합니다. 우리는 중국이 우리에게 호의를 베푸는 것이 아니라 전 세계에 대한 공동의 의무와 의무를 다하기 위해 이러한 문제에 대해 우리와 협력하겠다는 약속을 이행할 것을 촉구합니다. 이러한 문제를 함께 해결하는 것은 양국의 국익에도 도움이 될 것입니다.

I. STATE OF OUR ECONOMIES

먼저 양국의 경제 상황에 대해 말씀드리겠습니다.
최근 몇 년 동안 많은 사람들이 미국과 중국 간의 갈등이 점점 더 피할 수 없는 것으로 보고 있습니다. 이는 일부 미국인들이 공유하는 미국이 쇠퇴하고 있다는 두려움에 기인합니다. 그리고 중국이 곧 미국을 제치고 세계 최고의 경제 대국으로 도약할 것이며, 이는 국가 간 충돌로 이어질 것이라는 두려움 때문이었습니다.
한 가지 중요한 사실은 미국의 쇠퇴에 대한 주장은 수십 년 동안 계속되어 왔다는 것입니다. 그러나 이러한 주장은 항상 틀렸다는 것이 증명되었습니다. 미국은 새로운 도전에 맞서 적응하고 재창조하는 능력을 반복해서 입증해 왔습니다. 이번에도 다르지 않을 것이며 경제 통계가 그 이유를 보여줍니다.
냉전 종식 이후 미국 경제는 대부분의 다른 선진국보다 빠르게 성장했습니다. 그리고 지난 2년 동안 주요 선진국 중 팬데믹 이후 가장 강력한 회복세를 보였습니다. 실업률은 역사적 최저치에 근접했습니다. 1인당 실질 GDP는 사상 최고치를 기록했으며, 지난 2년간 신규 비즈니스는 사상 가장 강력한 성장을 경험했습니다.
이러한 회복은 우리의 경제 펀더멘털이 강하기 때문에 가능했습니다. 물론 이것이 우리의 일이 끝났다는 것을 의미하지는 않습니다. 우리의 최우선 경제 과제는 인플레이션을 억제하는 동시에 경기 회복에 따른 경제적 이득을 보호하는 것입니다. 몇 주 전, 미국은 두 지역 금융기관의 실패 이후 은행 시스템에 대한 대중의 신뢰를 강화하기 위해 결정적인 조치를 취했습니다. 미국 은행 시스템은 여전히 건전하며 미국이 세계에서 가장 강력하고 안전한 금융 시스템을 계속 유지하기 위해 필요한 모든 조치를 취할 것입니다.

지난 수십 년 동안 중국은 인상적인 경제 성장을 경험했습니다. 1980년부터 2010년까지 중국 경제는 연평균 10%씩 성장했습니다. 그 결과 수억 명의 인구가 빈곤에서 벗어나는 놀라운 성과를 거두었습니다. 중국의 빠른 추격 성장은 글로벌 무역에 대한 개방과 시장 개혁의 추진에 힘입은 바 큽니다. 
하지만 다른 많은 국가와 마찬가지로 오늘날 중국도 단기적인 역풍에 직면해 있습니다. 여기에는 부동산 부문의 취약성, 높은 청년 실업률, 취약한 가계 소비 등이 포함됩니다. 장기적으로 중국은 구조적인 문제에 직면해 있습니다. 인구가 고령화되고 있으며 노동 인구는 이미 감소하고 있습니다. 또한 경제 민족주의로 돌아서고 정부의 경제 개입을 크게 늘리는 정책으로 인해 생산성 증가율이 급격히 감소하고 있습니다. 이러한 최근의 상황은 중국의 발전이나 중국인의 노력과 재능을 훼손하지 않습니다. 하지만 중국의 장기적인 성장률은 하락할 것으로 보입니다. 

물론 경제 규모만이 경제력을 결정하는 유일한 요인은 아닙니다. 미국은 세계에서 가장 큰 경제 대국이지만, 부에서 기술 혁신에 이르기까지 다양한 경제 지표에서 타의 추종을 불허하는 리더로 남아 있습니다. 미국의 1인당 GDP는 세계에서 가장 높은 수준이며 중국의 5배가 넘습니다. 미국의 성공은 자원이나 지리보다도 국민, 가치, 제도에 기인한다고 할 수 있습니다. 미국의 민주주의는 완벽하지는 않지만 지속 가능한 성장의 근간이 되는 자유로운 아이디어 교환과 법치를 보호합니다. 미국의 교육 및 과학 기관은 세계를 선도합니다. 중국을 포함한 새로운 이민자들로 인해 미국의 혁신 문화가 더욱 풍성해졌으며, 이를 통해 세계 최고 수준의 첨단 제품과 산업을 지속적으로 창출할 수 있게 되었습니다.

중요한 것은 우리의 경제력은 혼자가 아니기 때문에 증폭된다는 것입니다. 미국은 인도 태평양을 포함한 전 세계 모든 지역의 가까운 친구이자 파트너를 소중히 여깁니다. 21세기에 고립된 국가는 국민을 위한 강력하고 지속 가능한 경제를 만들 수 없습니다. 그렇기 때문에 바이든 대통령의 리더십 아래 미국은 다른 국가와의 관계를 재건하고 재투자하기 위해 노력해 왔습니다.
이 모든 것을 말하고자 합니다: 중국의 경제 성장이 미국의 경제 리더십과 양립할 필요는 없습니다. 미국은 여전히 세계에서 가장 역동적이고 번영하는 경제입니다. 우리는 어떤 나라와의 건전한 경제 경쟁을 두려워할 이유가 없습니다.

II. SECURING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS(국가 안보 이익 확보 및 인권 보호)

우리 앞에는 많은 도전이 있습니다. 하지만 대통령과 저는 중국과 미국이 경제 관계를 책임감 있게 관리할 수 있다고 믿습니다. 우리는 양국이 세계 경제 발전을 공유하고 주도하는 미래를 향해 노력할 수 있습니다. 우리가 이 비전을 달성할 수 있을지는 앞으로 몇 년 동안 양국이 무엇을 하느냐에 달려 있습니다.
우리의 첫 번째 목표인 국가 안보 확보와 인권 보호에 대해 말씀드리겠습니다. 이는 우리가 타협하지 않을 분야입니다.

National Security

우리의 모든 대외 관계에서와 마찬가지로 국가 안보는 중국과의 관계에서 가장 중요합니다. 예를 들어, 우리는 중국의 군사 및 보안 장치로부터 특정 기술을 보호하는 것이 중요한 국익이라는 점을 분명히 해왔습니다.
우리는 이러한 목표를 달성하기 위한 광범위한 도구를 보유하고 있습니다. 필요한 경우, 우리는 좁은 범위의 조치를 취할 것입니다. 미국 정부의 조치는 수출 통제의 형태로 나타날 수 있습니다. 여기에는 인민해방군을 지원하는 단체의 접근을 제한하는 단체 목록 추가가 포함될 수 있습니다. 재무부는 사이버 보안 및 중국의 군사-민간 융합과 관련된 위협에 대처할 수 있는 제재 권한을 보유하고 있습니다. 또한 미국 내 외국인 투자에 대한 국가 안보 위험을 면밀히 검토하고 그러한 위험을 해결하기 위해 필요한 조치를 취하고 있습니다. 그리고 국가 안보에 중대한 영향을 미치는 특정 민감한 기술에 대한 미국의 특정 해외 투자를 제한하는 프로그램을 고려하고 있습니다.
이러한 조치를 취하면서 분명히 말씀드리고 싶은 것은 이러한 국가 안보 조치는 우리가 경쟁 우위를 확보하거나 중국의 경제 및 기술 현대화를 억제하기 위해 고안된 것이 아니라는 점입니다. 이러한 정책이 경제에 영향을 미칠 수 있지만, 이는 명백한 국가 안보 고려에 따른 것입니다. 우리는 이러한 우려가 우리의 경제적 이익과 상충될지라도 타협하지 않을 것입니다.

경제 분야에서의 국가 안보 조치를 안내하는 핵심 원칙이 있습니다.

첫째, 이러한 조치는 범위를 좁게 설정하고 명확한 목표를 겨냥할 것입니다. 다른 분야로의 파급을 완화하기 위해 조정될 것입니다. 둘째, 이러한 도구는 쉽게 이해할 수 있고 실행 가능한 것이 중요합니다. 그리고 상황 변화에 따라 쉽게 조정할 수 있어야 합니다. 셋째, 가능한 경우 정책의 설계와 실행에 동맹국 및 파트너와 협력하고 조율할 것입니다.
또한 오해와 의도하지 않은 확전의 위험을 완화하기 위해서는 소통이 필수적입니다. 우리는 국가 안보 조치를 취할 때 다른 국가에 정책 논리를 지속적으로 설명할 것입니다. 의도하지 않은 결과에 대한 우려를 경청하고 해결해 나갈 것입니다.

우리의 가장 시급한 국가 안보 문제 중 하나는 러시아의 우크라이나에 대한 불법적이고 도발적인 전쟁입니다. 키예프를 방문했을 때 저는 러시아의 침략이 얼마나 잔인한지 직접 목격했습니다. 크렘린궁은 병원을 폭격하고, 문화 유적지를 파괴하고, 에너지망을 공격하여 민간인들에게 광범위한 고통과 고통을 안겨주었습니다. 러시아의 전쟁을 끝내는 것은 도덕적 의무입니다. 그것은 많은 무고한 생명을 구할 것입니다. 앞서 말했듯이, 이는 세계 경제를 위해 우리가 할 수 있는 최선의 일이기도 합니다. 러시아의 전쟁을 종식시키기 위해 우리는 현대 역사상 가장 신속하고, 가장 단합되고, 가장 야심찬 다자 제재 체제를 구축했습니다. 또한 광범위한 파트너 연합을 통해 우크라이나가 스스로를 방어할 수 있도록 지원을 제공했습니다.
중국이 러시아에 대해 "제한 없는" 파트너십과 지원을 제공하는 것은 전쟁 종식에 대해 진지하지 않다는 우려스러운 징후입니다. 중국과 다른 국가들이 러시아에 물질적 지원이나 제재 회피 지원을 제공하지 않는 것이 필수적입니다. 우리는 중국과 중국 관할권 내 기업들에게 미국의 입장을 계속해서 매우 분명하게 전달할 것입니다. 위반의 결과는 엄중할 것입니다.

Human Rights

국가 안보와 마찬가지로 인권 보호도 타협하지 않을 것입니다. 이 원칙은 우리가 전 세계와 소통하는 방식의 기본입니다.
전 세계는 중국 정부가 자국 내에서 탄압을 강화하는 것을 직접 목격했습니다. 중국 정부는 중국 국민을 감시하고 통제하기 위한 기술을 개발했으며, 이 기술은 현재 수십 개 국가에 수출되고 있습니다.
인권 침해는 전 세계의 도덕적 양심에 위배됩니다. 또한 중국을 포함한 거의 모든 국가가 가입한 유엔의 기본 원칙에도 위배됩니다. 미국은 전 세계에서 인권 침해가 발생하는 모든 곳에서 우리의 도구를 사용하여 인권 침해를 방해하고 억제할 것입니다.
미국은 공개적으로나 사석에서 중국과 함께 신장뿐만 아니라 홍콩, 티베트 및 중국의 다른 지역에서 중국 정부의 인권 침해에 대해 심각한 우려를 제기해 왔습니다. 그리고 우리는 조치를 취해왔고 앞으로도 계속할 것입니다. 고문부터 자의적 구금에 이르기까지 다양한 인권 침해에 대해 중국의 지역 관리와 기업에 제재를 부과했습니다. 또한 신장 지역에서 강제 노동으로 생산된 제품의 수입을 제한하고 있습니다.
이러한 조치 전반에 걸쳐 우리는 동맹국들과 협력하고 있으며, 우리 모두가 함께 할 때 더 효과적이라는 것을 알고 있습니다. 

III. TOWARDS HEALTHY ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT(건전한 경제 참여를 향해)

우리는 안보 이익과 인권 가치를 보호하면서 두 번째 목표인 양국 모두에게 이익이 되는 건전한 경제 참여도 추구할 것입니다.
당연한 것부터 시작하겠습니다. 미국과 중국은 세계에서 가장 큰 두 개의 경제대국입니다. 그리고 우리는 서로 깊숙이 통합되어 있습니다. 2021년 양국 간의 전체 교역액은 7,000억 달러를 넘어섰습니다. 우리는 캐나다와 멕시코를 제외한 다른 어떤 국가보다 중국과 더 많이 교역합니다. 미국 기업들은 중국에서 광범위한 사업을 운영하고 있습니다. 수백 개의 중국 기업이 세계에서 가장 깊고 유동적인 자본 시장의 일부인 미국 증권거래소에 상장되어 있습니다. 네이처 인덱스에 따르면 미국과 중국은 서로에게 가장 중요한 과학 협력국입니다. 그리고 중국은 여전히 미국 유학생들이 가장 많이 유학하는 국가 중 하나입니다.
앞서 말했듯이 미국은 우리의 중대한 이익이 위태로울 때 우리 입장을 주장할 것입니다. 그러나 우리는 미국 경제와 중국 경제를 "분리(decouple)"하려고 하지 않습니다. 양국 경제의 완전한 분리는 양국 모두에게 재앙이 될 것입니다. 이는 전 세계를 불안정하게 만들 것입니다. 오히려 우리는 중국과 미국 경제의 건전성이 밀접하게 연결되어 있다는 것을 알고 있습니다. 규칙을 준수하는 중국의 성장은 미국에도 도움이 될 수 있습니다. 예를 들어, 미국 제품 및 서비스에 대한 수요 증가와 미국 산업이 더욱 역동적으로 발전할 수 있습니다.

Modern Supply-Side Investments at Home

2021년 4월, 저는 재무장관으로서 처음으로 주요 국제 경제 정책 연설을 했습니다. 저는 "해외에서의 신뢰는 국내에서의 신뢰에서 시작된다"고 말했습니다. 기본적으로 21세기 미국의 경쟁 능력은 중국이 아닌 미국이 어떤 선택을 하느냐에 달려 있습니다.
우리의 경제 전략은 다른 경제를 억압하거나 봉쇄하는 것이 아니라 우리 자신에 대한 투자에 중점을 두고 있습니다.
연설 이후 2년 동안 미국은 현대적 공급측 경제학이라고 부르는 경제 의제를 추구해 왔습니다. 우리의 정책은 미국 경제의 생산 능력을 확대하기 위해 고안되었습니다. 즉, 우리 경제가 생산할 수 있는 것의 한도를 높이는 것입니다. 이를 위해 바이든 대통령은 세 가지 역사적인 법안에 서명했습니다. 도로, 교량, 항구를 현대화하고 초고속 인터넷에 대한 접근성을 확대하기 위한 우리 세대의 가장 야심 찬 노력인 초당적 인프라 법안(Infrastructure Law)을 제정했습니다. 우리는 반도체과학법안(CHIPS and Science Act)을 통해 미국 반도체 제조의 역사적인 확장을 이루었습니다. 또한 인플레이션 감축법(the Inflation Reduction Act)을 통해 청정 에너지에 대한 미국 최대의 투자를 진행하고 있습니다. 이러한 조치들은 미래 산업에서 미국의 강점을 강화했습니다. 그리고 이러한 조치들은 우리의 장기 경제 전망을 밝게 하고 있습니다.

Our Vision and Conditions for Healthy Economic Competition

미국이 추구하는 건전한 경제 경쟁의 본질을 이해하는 것이 중요합니다.
미국은 승자 독식의 경쟁을 추구하지 않습니다. 대신 공정한 규칙을 바탕으로 한 건전한 경제 경쟁이 시간이 지남에 따라 양국 모두에게 이익이 될 수 있다고 믿습니다. 경제학의 기본 원칙은 지속적이고 반복적인 경쟁이 상호 개선으로 이어질 수 있다는 것입니다. 스포츠 팀은 최고의 라이벌과 지속적으로 맞붙을 때 더 높은 수준의 경기력을 발휘합니다. 기업은 소비자를 대상으로 경쟁할 때 더 좋고 더 저렴한 상품을 생산합니다. 미국과 중국의 기업들이 서로 도전할 때 경제가 성장하고 생활 수준이 향상되며 새로운 혁신이 결실을 맺을 수 있는 세상이 열릴 수 있습니다.
예를 들어, 중국은 개인용 컴퓨터와 MRI와 같은 미국의 발명품으로부터 혜택을 받았습니다. 마찬가지로 중국의 새로운 과학 및 의학 발전이 미국과 전 세계에 도움이 될 수 있으며, 우리가 더 많은 첨단 연구와 혁신에 박차를 가할 수 있다고 믿습니다.
그러나 이러한 유형의 건전한 경쟁은 양측 모두에게 공정할 때만 지속 가능합니다.
중국은 오랫동안 정부 지원을 통해 자국 기업이 외국 경쟁업체를 희생시키면서 시장 점유율을 높이는 데 도움을 주었습니다. 그러나 최근 몇 년 동안 중국의 산업 정책은 더욱 야심차고 복잡해졌습니다. 중국은 국유 기업과 국내 민간 기업에 대한 지원을 확대하여 외국 경쟁업체를 압도하고 있습니다. 이는 전통적인 산업 분야뿐만 아니라 신흥 기술 분야에서도 마찬가지입니다. 이러한 전략은 지식재산권 도용 및 기타 불법적인 수단을 통해 새로운 기술 노하우와 지적 재산을 획득하려는 공격적인 노력과 결합되었습니다.
(특정 시장 실패를 바로잡는 등 특정 상황에서는 정부 개입이 정당화될 수 있습니다. )그러나 중국 정부는 다른 주요 경제국보다 훨씬 더 큰 규모와 범위에서 비시장적 수단을 사용하고 있습니다. 또한 중국은 미국 내 중국 기업에는 존재하지 않는 수많은 시장 접근 장벽을 미국 기업에 부과하고 있습니다. 예를 들어, 중국은 외국 기업이 중국에서 사업을 하기 위해 독점 기술을 국내 기업에 이전하도록 요구하는 경우가 많습니다. 중국 시장에 대한 이러한 접근 제한은 중국 기업에 유리하게 경쟁의 장을 기울이고 있습니다. 또한 중국이 외국인 투자를 재개한다고 밝힌 시점에 미국 기업을 대상으로 한 강압적 조치가 최근 증가하고 있는 것에 대해 우려하고 있습니다.

중국 정부의 조치는 글로벌 제조 활동의 입지에 큰 영향을 미쳤습니다. 그리고 미국과 전 세계의 근로자와 기업에 피해를 입혔습니다.
어떤 경우에는 중국이 경제력을 악용하여 취약한 무역 파트너에게 보복하고 강요하기도 했습니다. 예를 들어, 중국은 다른 국가의 외교적 조치에 대한 응징으로 특정 상품에 대한 보이콧을 사용했습니다. 이러한 행동에 대한 중국의 구실은 종종 상업적입니다. 그러나 중국의 진짜 목표는 자국이 싫어하는 선택에 대해 불이익을 가하고 주권 정부가 자국의 정치적 요구에 굴복하도록 강요하는 것입니다.
아이러니한 점은 미국이 요구하는 개방적이고 공정하며 규칙에 기반한 글로벌 경제가 중국의 경제 변혁을 가능하게 한 바로 그 국제 질서라는 점입니다. 그리고 중국의 불공정 관행으로 인해 발생하는 비효율성과 취약성은 결국 중국의 성장을 저해할 수 있습니다.
중국의 고위 관리들은 올해 초 연설을 포함해 자원 배분에서 시장이 ‘결정적인 역할’을 할 수 있도록 하는 것이 중요하다고 반복해서 말해왔습니다. 중국이 실제로 이러한 방향으로 정책을 전환하고 스스로 밝힌 개혁 목표를 달성한다면 중국과 세계를 위해 더 좋을 것입니다.
우리는 중국의 불공정 경제 관행에 대해 압박을 가하면서 동맹국 및 파트너와 협력하여 대응 조치를 계속 취해 나갈 것입니다. 바이든 대통령에게 최우선 순위는 우리의 중요한 공급망의 회복력입니다. 특정 부문에서 중국의 불공정 경제 관행으로 인해 중요 상품의 생산이 중국 내로 과도하게 집중되는 결과를 초래했습니다. 바이든 대통령의 리더십 아래 우리는 국내 제조업에만 투자하는 것이 아닙니다. 또한 공급 중단으로 이어질 수 있는 취약성을 완화하기 위한 ‘프렌드쇼어링’이라는 전략을 추진하고 있습니다. 우리는 신뢰할 수 있는 많은 거래 파트너와 함께 중요한 공급망에 이중화를 구축하고 있습니다.

물론 우리는 세계 경제 질서를 강화하는 가장 좋은 방법은 그것이 작동한다는 것을 세계에 보여주는 것임을 잘 알고 있습니다. 국제금융기구에 대한 우리의 투자와 전 세계와의 유대를 강화하기 위한 노력은 더 많은 사람들이 국제 경제 시스템의 혜택을 누릴 수 있도록 하고 있습니다. 또한 개발도상국에 대한 우리의 약속을 가속화하고 있습니다. 예를 들어, 미국과 나머지 G7은 2027년까지 6,000억 달러의 고품질 인프라 투자를 동원하는 것을 목표로 하고 있습니다. 우리는 이들 국가에 긍정적인 경제적 수익을 창출하고 지속 가능한 부채를 촉진하는 프로젝트에 초점을 맞추고 있습니다. 그리고 국제 시스템을 업데이트할 필요가 있다면 주저하지 않고 그렇게 할 것입니다. 미국은 기후 변화, 전염병, 취약성 및 분쟁과 같은 오늘날의 시급한 글로벌 도전에 더 잘 대처할 수 있도록 다자개발은행을 발전시키기 위해 주주들과 협력하고 있습니다.

LEADING TOGETHER ON GLOBAL CHALLENGES

중국과의 경제 참여 조건을 설정하면서 우리는 세 번째 목표인 주요 글로벌 도전 과제에 대한 협력도 추구할 것입니다. 다른 의견 차이에도 불구하고 글로벌 이슈에서 진전을 이루는 것이 중요합니다. 이것이 바로 세계가 세계 최대 두 경제대국으로부터 필요로 하는 것입니다.
이를 위해서는 거시경제 및 금융 협력을 위한 양국 간의 꾸준한 소통 라인을 지속적으로 발전시켜야 합니다. 미국과 중국의 경제 발전은 글로벌 금융 시장과 더 넓은 경제에 빠르게 파급될 수 있습니다. 우리는 경제 충격에 어떻게 대응하고 있는지에 대한 견고한 의견 교환을 유지해야 합니다. 류허 부총리 및 중국의 다른 고위 관리들과의 대화는 좋은 시작이었습니다. 저는 새로운 상대방과 함께 이러한 대화를 발전시켜 나가기를 희망합니다.
거시경제 외에도 오늘 제가 강조하고 싶은 두 가지 글로벌 우선순위가 있습니다: 채무 과잉(Debt Overhang)과 기후 변화입니다. 이 두 가지 문제는 양국이 협력하고 동맹국 및 파트너와 함께 협력할 때 가장 잘 관리할 수 있습니다.

Debt Overhang(채무 과잉)

첫째, 우리는 부채 문제에 직면한 신흥 시장과 개발도상국을 돕기 위해 함께 노력해야 합니다. 글로벌 부채 문제는 중국과 미국 간의 양자 간 문제가 아닙니다. 책임 있는 글로벌 리더십에 관한 문제입니다. 중국은 세계 최대 공식 양자 채권국으로서 부채를 완전히 상환할 수 없을 때 다른 공식 양자 채권국들과 마찬가지로 피할 수 없는 책임을 져야 합니다.
의미 있는 부채 탕감을 위해서는 중국의 참여가 필수적입니다. 그러나 중국은 너무 오랫동안 포괄적이고 시기적절한 방식으로 움직이지 않았습니다. 이는 필요한 조치를 가로막는 장애물 역할을 해왔습니다.
올해 초 잠비아를 방문했을 때 저는 부채 탕감의 시급성을 직접 느꼈습니다. 정부 및 비즈니스 리더들은 잠비아의 부채 과잉이 어떻게 중요한 공공 및 민간 투자를 가로막고 경제 발전을 저해하고 있는지에 대해 저에게 이야기했습니다. 하지만 이런 상황에 처한 나라는 잠비아뿐이 아닙니다. 국제통화기금(IMF)은 저소득 국가의 절반 이상이 부채 위기에 처했거나 이미 처한 것으로 추정하고 있습니다. 
미국은 중국과 신속한 부채 처리의 필요성에 대해 광범위한 논의를 해왔습니다. 우리는 중국이 최근 스리랑카에 대해 구체적이고 신뢰할 수 있는 자금 조달 보증을 제공함으로써 IMF가 프로그램을 진행할 수 있게 된 것을 환영합니다. 그러나 이제 중국을 포함한 스리랑카의 모든 양자 채권국은 보증에 따라 적시에 채무 처리를 제공해야 합니다. 우리는 중국의 완전한 참여를 계속 촉구하여 IMF 매개 변수에 따라 다른 사례에서 부채 처리를 제공 할 것을 촉구합니다. 여기에는 잠비아 및 가나와 같은 긴급한 사례가 포함됩니다.

부채에 대한 즉각적인 조치는 중국의 이익에 부합합니다. 필요한 채무 처리를 지연하면 차입자와 채권자 모두의 비용이 증가합니다. 이는 채무자의 경제 펀더멘털을 악화시키고 결국 채무 탕감이 필요한 금액을 증가시킵니다.
더 넓게 보면 국제 채무 구조조정 프로세스에는 상당한 개선의 여지가 있습니다. 저희는 IMF 및 세계은행과 함께 다양한 이해관계자들과 협력하여 저소득 국가를 위한 공통 프레임워크 프로세스와 채무 처리 프로세스를 개선하기 위해 노력하고 있습니다. 잠비아 관계자들로부터 들은 바에 따르면, 이러한 문제를 해결하는 것이 다자주의의 진정한 시험대라고 합니다.

Climate Change

둘째, 우리 모두를 위협하는 오랜 글로벌 과제를 해결하기 위해 함께 노력해야 합니다. 기후 변화가 가장 큰 문제입니다. 역사는 양국이 할 수 있는 일이 무엇인지 보여줍니다. 미국과 중국 간의 기후 협력의 순간은 파리 협정을 비롯한 세계적인 돌파구를 가능하게 했습니다.
우리는 이 길을 선도할 공동의 책임이 있습니다. 중국은 온실가스 최대 배출국이며 미국이 그 뒤를 잇고 있습니다. 미국은 그 역할을 다할 것입니다. 지난 한 해 동안 미국은 미국 역사상 가장 과감한 국내 기후 조치를 취했습니다. 우리의 투자는 파리 협정( the Paris Agreement)에 따른 미국의 약속을 이행하고 2050년까지 순 제로(net-zero) 배출을 달성하기 위한 궤도에 올랐습니다. 또한 이러한 투자는 청정 에너지 기술 비용 절감 등 전 세계에 긍정적인 파급 효과를 가져올 것입니다. 또한 각국이 탄소 배출을 줄이기 위해 정의로운 에너지 전환을 할 수 있도록 해외에서도 노력하고 있습니다. 이러한 전환은 에너지 접근성을 확대하고 영향을 받는 지역사회와 근로자에게 경제적 기회를 제공하는 데도 도움이 될 것입니다.
우리는 중국이 ' Joint Glasgow Declaration'에서 약속한 사항을 이행할 것으로 기대합니다. 여기에는 감축 목표를 달성하고 감축되지 않은 석탄 화력 발전소에 대한 해외 자금 조달을 중단하는 것이 포함됩니다. 또한 중국은 개발도상국과 신흥 시장의 청정 에너지 전환을 지원해야 합니다. 나아가 우리는 지속가능한 금융에 관한 G20 실무그룹 공동의장국으로서 민간 자본 흐름을 촉진하기 위해 함께 노력하기를 기대합니다.
우리는 기후변화라는 실존적 도전에 대해 중국과 협력할 준비가 되어 있습니다. 그리고 우리는 중국이 우리와 진지하게 협력하고 약속을 이행할 것을 촉구합니다. 그렇지 않기에는 그 대가가 너무 높습니다.

CONCLUSION

어떤 사람들은 미국과 중국의 관계를 강대국 갈등의 프레임, 즉 한쪽이 몰락해야 다른 쪽이 상승하는 제로섬 양자 대결의 프레임으로 바라봅니다.
바이든 대통령과 저는 그렇게 생각하지 않습니다. 우리는 세계가 우리 모두에게 충분히 크다고 믿습니다. 중국과 미국은 함께 살면서 글로벌 번영을 공유할 수 있는 방법을 찾을 수 있고 또 찾아야 합니다. 우리는 서로의 차이를 인정하고, 각자의 이익을 지키며, 공정하게 경쟁할 수 있습니다. 실제로 미국은 미국 경제의 근본적인 힘과 미국 노동자들의 기술에 대한 확신을 가지고 계속 나아갈 것입니다. 그러나 바이든 대통령이 말했듯이 "우리는 경쟁이 갈등에 가까운 것이 되지 않도록 해야 할 책임이 있습니다."
강대국 간의 교전 윤곽을 협상하는 것은 어려운 일입니다. 그리고 미국은 우리의 안보와 원칙을 결코 타협하지 않을 것입니다. 하지만 중국도 기꺼이 역할을 해준다면 앞으로 나아갈 길을 찾을 수 있습니다.
이것이 제가 적절한 시기에 중국을 방문할 계획인 이유입니다. 저는 베이징의 정치적 전환 이후 새로운 중국 정부와 경제 문제에 대해 중요하고 실질적인 대화를 나누고 싶습니다. 저는 이 대화가 양국 관계를 책임감 있게 관리하고 양국과 세계가 공동으로 도전하는 분야에서 협력할 수 있는 토대를 마련하는 데 도움이 될 것이라고 믿습니다.
아시다시피 저는 무역을 전공한 경제학자입니다. 경제학은 일반적으로 전체 경제의 구조와 성과에 관한 분야로 인식되고 있습니다. 하지만 가장 세부적인 수준에서 경제학은 훨씬 더 기초적인 학문입니다. 경제학은 사람들이 내리는 선택에 대한 학문입니다. 특히 희소성, 위험, 때로는 스트레스와 같은 특정 상황에서 사람들이 어떻게 선택을 하는지를 연구합니다. 그리고 개인과 기업의 선택이 서로에게 어떤 영향을 미치는지, 그리고 이러한 선택이 국가 또는 글로벌 그림에 어떻게 합쳐지는지 살펴봅니다.
다시 말해, 경제는 사람들이 내리는 선택의 총합에 불과합니다.
미국과 중국의 관계도 마찬가지입니다. 우리의 길은 미리 정해진 것이 아니며 비용이 많이 들도록 예정된 것도 아닙니다. 이 관계의 궤적은 협력할 때와 경쟁할 때, 그리고 경쟁 속에서도 평화와 번영에 대한 공동의 이해관계가 있음을 인정할 때를 포함하여 이 두 강대국의 우리 모두가 시간이 지남에 따라 내리는 선택의 총합입니다.
미국은 미국과 중국 간의 책임감 있는 경제 관계가 양국 국민의 이익에 부합한다고 믿습니다. 이는 전 세계의 희망이자 기대입니다. 그리고 이 도전의 순간에 미국과 중국 두 나라가 선택해야 한다고 믿습니다. 
감사합니다.