미국 에너지부 장관을 지낸 어니스트 모니즈 핵위협제안(NTI) 공동의장이 4일 서울 웨스틴조선호텔에서 경향신문과 인터뷰하고 있다. 이상훈 선임기자

“북한이 핵무기 일부를 미국에 건네야 한다는, 이른바 초기이행(Frontloading) 아이디어는 실용적이지 않다. 북한 핵무기는 북한 내에서 북한 과학기술자들에 의해 해체돼야 한다. 국제사회의 역할은 이를 재정적, 기술적으로 지원하고 검증 체제를 만드는 것이다. 그게 바로 협력적으로 위협을 줄이는 방식이다.” 

이란·러 비핵화 관여 경험 

어니스트 모니즈 전 미국 에너지부 장관(73)은 인류가 지금까지 해온 두 번의 대표적 비핵화 과정에 모두 관여해왔다. 2015년 이란 핵합의(JCPOA) 협상의 산파역인 동시에 1990년대 옛 소련지역의 핵무기 제거를 지원한 협력적위협감소(CTR) 프로그램의 주역이다. 미국 싱크탱크 핵위협제안(NTI)의 공동의장으로 두 가지 경험을 북한에 적용하는 NTI 연구 백서를 연내 발표할 예정이다. 동아시아재단 초청으로 내한한 그를 지난 4일 서울 소공동 웨스틴조선호텔에서 만났다.

북한 핵무기, 자국 내에서 
북 과학자들이 해체해야
어딘가로 옮기는 건 위험
 

모니즈는 북한에 의한 핵무기 해체의 이유로 “북핵은 우크라이나·카자흐스탄·벨라루스와 달리 북한 스스로 디자인, 제조한 것이기 때문”이라고 설명했다. 또 미국을 포함한 다른 어떤 나라로든 핵무기는 옮기는 것 자체가 안전하지 않다는 까닭에서다. 

그는 또 “어떠한 사찰 및 검증 시스템도 없는 상태에서 북한의 주장을 어떻게 믿겠느냐”고 반문하면서 북한을 상대로 핵무기 목록을 먼저 제출하라는 도널드 트럼프 행정부 일각의 요구 역시 비핵화의 ‘좋은 시작’이 아니라고 단언했다. 

국제사회, 검증 지원 역할 
핵물질 전환, 많은 틀 필요

모니즈에 따르면 비핵화 협상은 “복잡하지만 단계별로 협상에 착수해 매 단계 검증의 기준(bar)을 높여가면서 실질적인 합의서를 쌓아가는 과정”이다. 단계별 사찰이 진행될수록 북한 핵프로그램에 대해 더 많은 것을 알게 될 것이고 이를 다시 더 높은 검증 기준으로 키워갈 수 있다는 말이다. 끊임없는 협상과 합의와 각각의 합의를 토대로 완성도를 높이는 ‘자기증식형 검증 시스템’이 그가 제안하는 방식이다. 

모니즈는 검증이 중요한 또 다른 이유로 트럼프 행정부는 북한과의 비핵화 합의를 조약 형태로 상원 비준을 받겠다고 말하는바, “검증 시스템이 없는 합의는 결코 의회 문턱을 넘지 못할 것이기 때문”이라고 설명했다. 

핵물리학자 출신인 모니즈가 ‘초기이행’이나 ‘핵무기 목록 제출’ 대신 강조한 북핵 비핵화 순서는 핵실험 시설→핵물질→핵무기의 3가지 순서로 협상을 진행하되 단계마다 다시 몇개의 작은 단계로 나누어 계속 협상해나가는 방식이다. 예를 들어 핵물질의 경우 생산 중단→핵물질의 불가역적인 전환(transfer)→제거의 순으로 합의를 이어가야 한다는 말이다. “2년 걸린 이란 핵합의 막판에 미국 국무부·에너지부 장관 등 장관 4명이 17일 동안 협상장을 떠나지 않았다. 이란과 달리 핵무기를 확보한 북한과의 협상은 훨씬 더 장기 과정이 될 것이다.” 

9월 평양공동선언에서 북한이 조건부로 다짐한 영변 핵시설의 영구적 폐기 및 추가적 조치 용의를 “매우 중요한 약속”이라고 긍정 평가하면서도 “핵물질 생산을 중단한다고 해도 핵물질을 전환하기 위해선 수많은 해결의 틀을 만들어야 한다”고 역설했다. 러시아가 무기급 고농축우라늄 500t을 원전 연료용으로 전환, 미국에 판매했던 사실을 일례로 들면서 “한국이 북한의 무기급 핵물질을 국내 원전의 연료로 사용할 수도 있을 것”이라고 말했다. 

그는 그러나 북한이 영변 핵시설 폐기의 조건으로 내건 상응조치를 미국이 취할지에 대해서는 즉답하지 않았다. 

완성도 높은 비핵화를 위해 그가 충분조건으로 꼽는 것은 다국적 합의다. “비핵화 협상은 결코 미국과 북한의 양자 간에 이뤄질 문제가 아니다”라고 못 박으면서 “일본과 한국, 중국은 물론 어쩌면 러시아도 포함해야 할 것”이라고 말했다. 

가급적 많은 나라들이 참여해야 북한의 합의 불이행 또는 거짓 합의 경우 국제사회가 더욱 강력하고 응집력 높은 대북 대응조치를 취할 수 있다는 이유에서다.


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http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201810072207005&code=910303#csidxc8e9b3baeac8bbeb519decf9fa0e41d



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  1. dkfg 2021.07.28 17:52  댓글주소  수정/삭제  댓글쓰기

    INTERVIEW/ Obama official: Nuke powers erred in ignoring ban treaty talks
    By TAKASHI WATANABE/ Correspondent

    February 1, 2021 at 07:30 JST
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    Ernest Moniz served as U.S. energy secretary between May 2013 and January 2017. (Provided by the U.S. Department of Energy)
    A key official in the Obama administration in charge of nuclear security says the five major nuclear powers erred in refusing a seat at the table for discussions on a U.N. treaty to ban nuclear weapons.

    Former Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said he believes the five major powers made a mistake in not joining the talks that eventually led to the U.N. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

    Moniz, a nuclear physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, served as energy secretary under then U.S. President Barack Obama between May 2013 and January 2017.

    In an online interview with The Asahi Shimbun on Jan. 6, Moniz talked about the United States and the four other major nuclear powers skipping out on the TPNW discussions.

    He said in his personal view the five powers “made a mistake in not being part of the ban discussions.”

    He added that the ban treaty was “fundamentally consistent with the long-term goal” of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

    “I am hoping that if the United States and Russia make some of these gestures for heading in the direction of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, that it can reignite a dialogue between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states,” he said.

    The nuclear powers did not join the discussions on the TPNW because they felt it was moving too quickly toward a total ban on nuclear weapons.

    Those nations did not sign the treaty. Japan and other nations under the U.S. nuclear umbrella have also not signed the treaty, which took effect on Jan. 22 after 50 nations ratified the TPNW.

    Moniz also talked about the resistance put up by Japan and South Korea when discussions arose during the Obama administration of declaring that the United States would not use nuclear weapons in a first strike on an enemy nation.

    He said, “that discussion really came very, very late in the second term of the administration. It just didn't leave time for the kinds of discussions with our allies that one would need before making such a policy declaration.”

    Moniz also said that Japan, as the only nation to have an atomic bomb dropped on it, could play a special role in serving as a bridge between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear nations.

    Excerpts of the interview follow:

    Q: What is your view about the possibility of nuclear weapons being used today?

    Moniz: The risks of the use of a nuclear weapon are higher now than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis (in 1962). We are living in a different cyber world, and certainly today let's say the United States and Russia, with over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, we don't have any norms about cyber in nuclear command and control systems, in nuclear early warning systems. We've had no changes in the sole authority of the U.S. president on the use of nuclear weapons, and the person in charge has only 10 minutes to make a decision.

    Q: What is your assessment of the nuclear security policy of the Trump administration?

    Moniz: The Trump administration has elevated the role of nuclear weapons in our security posture. I think that was made probably the clearest with regard to the deployment of a so-called low yield weapon on nuclear submarines, which we think was completely unnecessary and reduces the threshold for use.

    The Biden administration intends to go back to the situation where the role of nuclear weapons in our overall security posture is reduced.

    Q: How do you view the moves regarding the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia, which is set to expire on Feb. 5?

    Moniz: We recommend that President Biden very early on agree to a New START extension, but simultaneously propose voluntarily a lower ceiling to invite Russia to do a reciprocal act. That's an example of something that at least goes in the direction also of the NPT obligations for continuing to work down the number of weapons.

    The new administration should pursue with Russia the inclusion of discussions on non-strategic weapons. It is premature to be thinking about things like arms control agreements involving China.

    That is not in the cards and probably doesn't make sense right now given the continuing asymmetry in the stockpiles. We think there are many things that could be done right now.

    We could see if China would join the United States and Russia in a reassertion of the Reagan-Gorbachev statement, that nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should not be fought. We could try to establish mechanisms for nuclear risk management between the United States and China.

    Q: When you were energy secretary during the Obama administration there was talk about the United States declaring a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge. Could you explain why that idea was eventually abandoned?

    Moniz: I'm not going to go into too much detail about those internal discussions, but I think what is fair to say is that that discussion really came very, very late in the second term of the administration. It just didn't leave time for the kinds of discussions with our allies that one would need.

    President Biden's emphasis on rebuilding alliances is so critical. We cannot unilaterally make some changes in our policy without having our Asian and European allies on board.

    Q: It was said that Japan and South Korea opposed the first-use declaration. Could you elaborate?

    Moniz: Japan and South Korea would have reasons to want to make sure that any move toward a (no-first strike pledge) was done in the context of the overall security relations, because the American security guarantees in the region remain very, very important.

    Q: What is your view of the TPNW? Do you think the gap between that treaty and the NPT can be closed?

    Moniz: I personally believe that the (five major powers) made a mistake in not being part of the ban discussions. I'm not saying that they should have said that it would be like an immediate ban, but the ban treaty after all is fundamentally consistent with the long-term goal of the NPT.

    If the United States and Russia make some of these gestures for heading in the direction of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, it can reignite a dialogue between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states.

    I think the decision made on the ban negotiations has made that harder rather than easier, which is why I think I would have recommended a different approach.

    Q: What role do you think Japan should play between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear nations?

    Moniz: I think Japan, obviously as the victim of nuclear weapons use, can play a special role, particularly as a strong friend and ally of the United States. I think it can play an important role in representing the non-nuclear arguments. I think Japan is stepping forward and that would be welcome. I think Japan has the standing to really be a strong voice in that discussion.

    (Peter Loewi contributed to this story)